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Opting Out of Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual
Choice of Law
Erin Ann O'Hara 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1551 (2000)
This Article uses public choice theory to analyze the
function of choice-of-law clauses in contracts. Choice-of-law
clauses are now quite common and are increasingly enforced,
especially with the proliferation of international and Internet
transactions. Because these clauses can be used by parties to
avoid regulation, academics are now vigorously debating the
extent to which this contractual opt out should be permitted.
The Article presents a positive political theory of the interplay
of legislative action and the enforcement of choice of law. It
demonstrates that the important normative debate over choice
of law is somewhat misguided because both sides fail to fully
understand the effect that these clauses can have on interest
group bargaining in the legislature. Once the issue is fully un-
derstood, seemingly counterintuitive posturing can result:
Regulatory proponents may actually favor choice-of-law
clauses, and Libertarians can find themselves opposing their
enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Virtually every regulator-whether legislator, judge, bureau-
crat, parent, or other institutional administrator-must, at some
point, consider the possibility that her subjects will elude her grasp.
Examples abound throughout history, indicating that people are
willful and notoriously difficult to control. Plaintiffs lawyers know
that the mere possibility of a damages award leads many defen-
dants to attempt to transfer, hide, or dissipate their assets.1 The
Internal Revenue Service is plagued by the reality that differential
tax treatment creates incentives for taxpayers to structure their
transactions strategically. 2 Efforts to regulate or otherwise limit
gun ownership3 or alcohol, 4 drug,5 or cigarette6 consumption inevi-
1. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 194-97 (3d Cir. 1990)
(empowering the district court to issue a preliminary injunction against a securities firm and
its president to protect future damages claims); Kern Alexander, The Mareva Injunction and
Anton Piller Order: The Nuclear Weapons of English Commercial Litigation, 11 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 487, 490 (1997) (discussing legal measures available to plaintiffs to preserve assets to sat-
isfy judgments); Linda J. Candler, Tracing and Recovering Proceeds of Crime in Fraud Cases:
A Comparison of U.S. and U.K Legislation, 31 INT'L LAW 3, 25-27 (1997) (same).
2. See Roger D. Lorence, The Demonization of Structured Finance Transactions, 10 J.
IN'L TAx'N 16 (1999) (discussing government's "war on tax-advantaged transactions").
3. See Brendan J. Healey, Plugging the Bullet Holes in U.S. Gun Law: An Ammunition-
Based Proposal for Tightening Gun Control, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 23 (1998) ("Back-
ground checks, as well as point-of-sale recordkeeping, could lead to a rise in black-market
trading in ammunition.").
4. See James Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 607, 650 (1990) (noting the curtailment of black market violence associated
with the production, distribution, and sale of alcohol when the Prohibition Era ended).
5. See Laura L. Hirschfeld, Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact of Drug
Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability, 7 CORNELL J.L. &
PuB. PoLY 757, 769 (1998) (discussing the elimination of the black market as the most com-
pelling argument favoring legalization or decriminalization of drugs).
6. See Regulation Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996) (noting the
possibility that the black market is a partial justification for not completely banning tobacco
products); Daniel K Benjamin & William R. Dougan, Efficient Excise Taxation: The Evidence
From Cigarettes, 40 J.L. & ECON. 113, 117 (1997) (discussing discrepancies in state cigarette
taxes that create incentives for interstate smuggling); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
1163, 1298-1301 (1998) (discussing the possibility of a black market in cigarettes). Black
markets can arise in any regulatory context. For a recent example, see Saleem S. Saab, Move
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tably encourage black market activity. Even worse, attempts to
control behavior can also create perverse incentives that produce
even more of the harm sought to be avoided. Under the Federal En-
dangered Species Act, for example, efforts to force landowners to
take measures to preserve endangered species have prompted them
to preemptively destroy habitats. 7
Potential evasion is ubiquitous, and the more easily a rule is
circumvented, the more difficult it becomes for the regulator to in-
fluence behavior. Indeed, sometimes the widespread disregard of
legal measures leads to their repeal, reformulation, or initial rejec-
tion. The Twenty-First Amendment eliminating prohibition,8 the
relaxation of the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit,9 and the Tax
Reform Act of 198610 are all examples. The converse is trivially
true too: the lower the cost of eliminating or containing evasion, the
more successful will be the regulator's efforts. For example, em-
ployee withholding taxes, when coupled with employer reporting
requirements, can significantly enhance the viability of an income
tax.'"
Over Drugs, There's Something Cooler on the Black Market-Freon: Can the New Licensing
System Stop CFC Trafficking?, 16 DICK- J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1998). U.S. prohibition on the
production of chloroflurocarbons coupled with low production costs in developing countries has
generated a growing black market in the trafficking of CFCs. See id.
7. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for
Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153-54 (1999) ("Because the government has
limited monitoring capabilities, many property owners also will try to eliminate endangered
species or destroy potential habitat while the government is not looking."); Dean Lueck &
Jeffrey Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 23-24
(May 1999) (draft manuscript, presented at American Law and Economics Association meet-
ings).
8. See Symposium, A Fork in the Road: Build More Prisons or Develop New Strategies to
Deal with Offenders, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385, 402 (1999) (quoting Odie Washington, Director of
the Illinois Department of Corrections, as remarking, 'Tm always reminded that we worked
for about fourteen years during prohibition to stop our nation from drinking. We ultimately
found out how unsuccessful that was. The legislators, writers, ministers and many, many
others in the community finally got together and... finally came to the conclusion that you
cannot legislate alcohol.").
9. See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217,
234 (1996) (noting widespread driver disregard of the fifty-five mile per hour limit and the fact
that several jurisdictions adjusted their limits to approximate more closely actual driver prac-
tice).
10. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 917-18 (Comm. Print 1987) (noting that under preceding law,
foreigners manipulated the transfer of their property to avoid U.S. taxes).
11. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and
the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 900 (1997) ("By a substantial mar-
gin, the IRS collects the taxes owed on employees' wages more successfully than it gathers the
taxes attributable to any other type of income. This success is universally attributed to em-
ployers' withholding from employees' compensation and employers' subsequent remittance to
the IRS of these withheld funds.") (citations omitted).
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To curtail circumvention, lawmakers often must attempt to
control several margins simultaneously. Take, for example, efforts
to eliminate racial discrimination in the workplace. As civil rights
advocates have always known, a racist employer confronted with a
law prohibiting discrimination in hiring has many other avenues
along which to satisfy his discriminatory tastes. He can pay his mi-
nority employees less, treat them disparately regarding their job
responsibilities and privileges, pass them over for promotions, fire
them with less cause, or otherwise create or encourage a hostile
work environment. 12 Although anti-discrimination efforts have pro-
duced some success, many people are left discouraged and cynical
about the enormity of the task. 18 Generally, the more easily compli-
ance leakage can be clamped off, the more likely it becomes that the
regulatory machine can deliver changes in behavior.
These basic truisms raise an interesting question: why do
regulators sometimes forgo efforts to prevent evasion? Some types
of evasion are both acknowledged and permitted by those charged
with making or enforcing rules. Leakage in these contexts can rep-
resent acknowledgement of the limits, either de jure or de facto, of
regulatory authority.14 Or, they can indicate regulator insincerity
about legal enforcement. 15 But the problem can be recast from the
perspective of those who demand the rules: why do interest groups
seeking proposed legislation sometimes not advocate simple meas-
12. Cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
5 (1992) ("Racial discrimination in the workplace is as vicious-if less obvious-than it was
when employers posted signs: no negroes need apply."); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title
VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 393-94 (1995)
(noting that "[s]outhern school systems engaged in resistance of various forms which
amounted to an evasion of Brown").
13. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever
Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 923 (1988) (referring to race as "America's oldest and most in-
tractable problem"); see also Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Cele-
bration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1623 (1986) (criticizing
courts for their ineffective treatment of race cases).
14. See, e.g., BARRY C. FIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 219-20 (1994) (noting that the
inevitability of limited budgets may foreclose the possibility of ever reaching acceptable levels
of compliance with environmental regulation); Michael D. Montgomery, Raising the Level of
Compliance with the Clean Water Act by Utilizing Citizens and the Broad Dissemination of
Information to Enhance Civil Enforcement of the Act, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 533, 541-42 (1999)
(discussing the EPA's lack of staff necessary to pursue more than a fraction of Clean Water
Act violators).
15. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 528 (1987)
("Many critics of Reagan's executive orders maintain that an antiregulatory administration
has used the regulatory review process to postpone or discourage altogether the promulgation
of rules needed to protect the public health and safety.").
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ures that would have the effect of eliminating some evasion of the
proposed law?
This Article explores the evasion of one type of regulation-
rules that limit or interfere with parties' ability to contract. Laws
forbid the making of some contracts, and examples include prohibi-
tions on contracts for murder, gambling, and prostitution. 6 Out-
right criminal prohibitions on contracting typically produce under-
ground markets that involve organized crime. 17 More typically,
regulations either forbid or mandate the incorporation of certain
contract terms. Minimum wage laws, worker's compensation rules,
securities regulations, franchise termination laws, usury laws, and
insurance regulations provide just a few examples. 18
The means by which the regulated can avoid governing re-
strictions vary, but at least two options do not involve illegality.
First, individuals can physically exit the jurisdiction by locating or
conducting their business elsewhere. 19 One is free to gamble in Ne-
vada,20 pay less to workers in Mexico, 21 charge unlimited interest in
South Dakota, 22 and so on. Given that each jurisdiction provides a
16. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall," 79 B.U.
L. REV. 263, 290 (1999) (explaining that some contracts, like contracts for murder, are
bilaterally criminal, while others, such as usurious contracts, are unilaterally criminal).
Courts will not enforce contractual obligations to perform illegal acts. See Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 78 (1982); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899); Armstrong
v. Toler, 24 U.S. 258, 271-70 (1826); In re American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223, 228 (6th
Cir. 1941); Ewing v. National Airport Corp., 115 F.2d 859, 860 (4th Cir. 1940); see also How-
ard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 37 (noting that gambling con-
tracts are unenforceable as illegal); Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849, 1937 n.261 (1987) (noting that contracts to render sexual services are void as ille-
gal). See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1476 (1963) (explaining that
contracts in furtherance of immorality are void).
17. See supra notes 3-6 (discussing black markets that arise with regulatory restrictions).
18. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 23-24 (1965) (noting that pub-
lic policy developments replaced contracts, including "labor law, antitrust law, insurance law,
business regulation, and social welfare legislation").
19. For two classic discussions of this "exit' option, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-29
(1970); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(arguing that the ability of citizens to move to a jurisdiction with more favorable provision of
public goods, including laws, serves to discipline local political bodies by creating interjurisdic-
tional competition for citizens).
20. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.450 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.335 (1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0129 (1994).
21. See Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Symposium on the North American Free
Trade Agreement. Side Agreements, Sidesteps and Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free
Trade in North America, 34 HARV. INTL L.J. 333, 335 (1993).
22. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 776 F. Supp. 21, 26 (D. Mass. 1991)
(noting that both Delaware and South Dakota have eliminated their usury laws after federal
laws were interpreted to enable banks to charge any interest rate permissible in their home
state).
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menu of benefits to its domiciliaries, however, even temporary exit
can be undesirable. Second, parties may be able to remain in the
state but contract for the law of an unregulating jurisdiction. For
example, a credit card agreement might provide that it is governed
by and subject to the law of South Dakota and that any future dis-
putes between the parties will be resolved according to South Da-
kota law. In fact, this cheapest form of evasion, contractual choice
of law, is on the rise in the United States and has been used suc-
cessfully to avoid civil liability even for activities otherwise deemed
criminal.23
Presumably interest group proponents have a stake in pre-
venting this regulatory slippage. More often than not, however,
legislation includes no provision preventing contracting parties
from avoiding statutory compliance with a choice-of-law clause.
Contractual choice of law is increasingly enforced, 24 and, when no
precedent controls, applicable judicial standards leave resolution of
the issue considerably uncertain. 25 As a consequence, statutory si-
lence regarding choice of law often creates a significant possibility
for successful contractual evasion. Why don't interest groups rou-
tinely seek legislative insurance to control this leakage?
The answer likely includes several partial explanations. The
lobbyist might be ignorant about choice of law, or he could be lazy,
or hoping to generate future fees from his interest group members
by raising the issue later. Alternatively, the law could be primarily
symbolic; some laws express and encourage important moral or
ethical sentiments even though they are virtually impossible to en-
force. Still, in many cases, dedicated and sophisticated interest
group representatives do propose enforceable laws without at-
tempting to prevent evasion through contractual choice of law.
This Article offers a competing explanation for why choice of
law goes unhindered in some statutes: contractual evasion makes it
more likely that the interest group will obtain the benefit it seeks
from the legislature. Although contractual opt outs appear to evis-
23. See, e.g., Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1998) (en-
forcing the choice-of-law provision to enable defendant to avoid federal securities fraud and
RICO laws); Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744,
753-54 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the parties' choice of Mississippi law was effective to avoid
Texas usury law); Christiansen v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 972 F. Supp. 681, 685 (S.D. Ga. 1997)
(holding that Delaware's choice-of-law clause was enforceable even though terms of agreement
violated Georgia's criminal usury statute). Although a choice-of-law provision might possibly
affect a prosecutor's decision to press charges, presumably the parties cannot waive any
criminal liabilities to which they may be subject.
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part I.B.
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cerate interest group transfers, sometimes an opt out actually
guarantees a transfer by making it politically palatable. More in-
terestingly, when parties can be expected to bargain around the
regulatory transfer by other means, contractual choice of law serves
a purpose different from that assumed in the conflicts literature.26
In these cases, a choice-of-law clause helps the parties eliminate
future dead weight losses that society would incur in the absence of
contractual choice. Thus, it is possible for contractual choice of law
to reduce the costs, but not the benefits, associated with the regula-
tion, thereby enhancing the likelihood of its enactment.
This analysis generates some interesting implications for the
current academic debate on contractual choice of law. Those op-
posed to unconstrained contractual choice of law typically seek to
empower the regulating state to alleviate social problems.27 In con-
trast, those who favor broad contractual choice tend to scorn the
underlying regulations. 28 From a systemic perspective, some have
recently argued that contractual choice of law promotes competition
among jurisdictions to create improved legal systems.29 Although
debaters disagree about whether choice of law generates a race to
the top or a race to the bottom for state lawmaking, both sides seem
to assume that enforcing choice-of-law provisions inevitably leads to
fewer regulations.
This Article demonstrates that the debaters' assumption can
be both false and misleading. By focusing on the ex ante incentives
that choice of law creates for interest groups, I hope to demonstrate
that in some cases, choice-of-law clauses enhance interest group
incentives to seek regulatory wealth transfers while simultaneously
dampening opposition to the proposed laws. If a particular law is
primarily motivated to transfer wealth rather than generate social
benefits, then permitting the regulated party to opt out in future
periods can actually enhance its political viability.
Part I of this Article briefly describes current law regarding
choice-of-law clauses. When regulations do not specifically prohibit
contractual choice, these clauses are increasingly used and enforced
by the courts. Drafters also are more frequently incorporating
these clauses into contracts in order to avoid states' mandatory
rules (those around which the parties could not otherwise contract).
After describing the law surrounding choice-of-law clauses, this Ar-
26. See infra Part II.C.2.
27. See infra Part 1.C.
28. See infra Part H.C.
29. See infra Part I.C.
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ticle analyzes the function of the clauses from an economic and
public choice perspective. Part II.A discusses the relationship be-
tween choice of law and the Coase Theorem, and Part II.B intro-
duces a few simple but important insights from public choice the-
ory. Both the Coase Theorem and public choice theory turn out to
be relevant to the debate over contractual choice of law. Part II.C
presents a decision tree to illustrate the influence that choice-of-law
provisions have on interest group efforts to generate laws. Part I1.C
also discusses the effect of the clauses on both laws that are per-
ceived to be beneficial and those that are adjudged harmful.3 0 For
laws that (1) are primarily geared to transfer wealth from one
group to another; and (2) represent, de facto, a one-time, rather
than a periodic or ongoing, wealth transfer, contractual choice of
law has the counterintuitive effect of actually enhancing the effec-
tiveness of the law.
Part III explores this special category of regulation, using
franchise termination laws as a possible example. For reasons ex-
plained in Part III, groups attempting to transfer wealth often pro-
pose a regulatory vehicle to achieve that transfer. If the bulk of the
transfer occurs in a single period rather than continuing into the
future, then contractual choice of law can provide future benefits to
both the winners and the losers of the wealth transfer.
I. CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW IN A NUTSHELL
Until about forty years ago, all of the U.S. states followed a
rule-based approach to determine which state's substantive law
would apply to resolve a multi-state dispute.3 1 Because these suits
involved people, property and events that touched more than one
jurisdiction, the rules, as at least roughly embodied in the First Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, 32 attempted to delineate which of the
involved states should have the power to determine the parties'
rights and obligations.83 These territorial rules came under attack
30. Admittedly it is difficult, indeed impossible, to establish objectively whether any law
is "good" or "efficient." See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2119-20 & n.213 (1996) (noting that analysts quite often dis-
agree about the efficiency of laws, including anti-discrimination laws and the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine). I nevertheless use the categories to locate the present debaters, who think they
know whether laws are good or bad, and to distinguish their positions, which depend upon
their assumptions, from the category of cases for which my analytical point holds.
31. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed. 1995) (ac-
knowledging that the territorial approach "once represented the universal American approach
to choice of law").
32. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
33. See JOSEPH H. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.1, 5.2 (1935).
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by the legal realists34 who found them arbitrary35 and, in any event,
rife with both ambiguities and escape devices3 6 that together
worked to eviscerate the very certainty and predictability that they
purported to deliver.37
As a result of this mounting criticism, a majority of the
states' courts began to move from the rule-based to one of a number
of standard-based approaches to choice of law.38 Some assert that
this choice-of-law revolution was, in essence, driven by a strong de-
sire to achieve progressive tort reforms,3 9 but whatever its motiva-
tion, the shift to standards did not enhance the certainty of the law
governing contracts.4° When choice-of-law decisions are made ac-
34. For well-known works that focus on the weaknesses of the traditional rule-based ap-
proach, see generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963); Fowler v. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Profes-
sor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in
a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230.
35. See William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of
Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1017
(1999) ('CTo conflicts scholars, the rules seemed largely arbitrary, indeed counterintuitive.")
(citing several examples of criticisms); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1197 (1987) (describing Walter Wheeler Cook's critique of traditional
choice-of-law rules).
36. See Allen & O'Hara, supra note 34, at 1017-18 (discussing criticisms regarding char-
acterization issues and public policy exception); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1963) ("As means to the end of predictability, [the
rules] are vulnerable to attack, not because they are too rigid, but because they are not rigid
enough.").
37. Cf. F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92, at 261-62 (3d ed. 1949)
(noting that application of a law other than that dictated by the First Restatement "would
impose a criterion which would not have been foreseen by at least one of the two parties to the
suit").
38. See 1 THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 395 (1998);
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2000). State counts for
the competing approaches vary by commentator. According to Patrick Borchers, for torts,
fifteen states have retained the First Restatement approach, twenty-four states have adopted
a Second Restatement approach, four states use interest analysis, and five states use a better
law approach, leaving three states unclassified. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 373-74 (1992); see also Symeon
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM.
J. COMP. L. 327, 331-45 (1999) (classifying states for torts and contracts cases).
39. See Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 553 (W. Va. 1986) C'[NMearly half of the
state supreme courts in this country have wrought a radical transformation of their proce-
dural law of conflicts in order to sidestep perceived substantive evils, only to discover later
that those evils had been exorcised from American law by other means."); BRILMAYER, supra
note 31, at 231-33; Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law That Focuses on Con-
sequences, 56 ALA. L. REV. 701, 701-03 (1993); Geri J. Yonover, Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining
in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 326-27 (1994) ' "[Tlort reform' wars often are
being fought on the conflict of laws battlefield.").
40. Actually, the First Restatement did a particularly poor job of providing choice-of-law
certainty in the area of contracts. Validity issues and issues regarding substantial perform-
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cording to multi-factored standards that are applied only after a
dispute arises, parties have severe difficulty knowing what law will
govern their future disputes. In some cases, they cannot even ascer-
tain whether their arrangement is legally enforceable.41
To restore some measure of certainty and predictability to
contracts, 42 courts increasingly began to recognize and enforce both
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses.43 The drafters of the Sec-
ond Restatement included a provision strongly favoring choice-of-
law clauses.44 Section 187 provides:
ance of the contract are governed by the "place of execution" of the contract, but determining
that place requires the uncertain application of the law of offer and acceptance. See Baxter,
supra note 35, at 4 (CWhen, and therefore where, binding agreement occurred is often debat-
able."). Moreover, while issues regarding substantial performance were to be governed by the
law of the place of execution, the details of performance were governed by the law of the place
of performance. Even the First Restatement drafters felt compelled to admit that "no logical
line" separates these two types of contract issues. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358
cmt. b (1934). My point in the text is simply that multi-factored standards are at least equally
poor choices for contracting parties who value the certainty and predictability of their contrac-
tual bargain and the duties that are owed pursuant to their relationship.
41. The Second Restatemenes general contract provision illustrates the difficulty of at-
tempting to apply a standard. It provides that the law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties'will determine the rights and duties of the
parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971). The court can
consider "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place
of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, [and] (e) the domicile
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." Id. § 188(2).
In determining the place with the most significant relationship, the court should take into
account "(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expecta-
tions, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result, [and] (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied." Id. § 6(2). "As Javolenus once said to Julian, res ipsa loquitur." Paul, 352 S.E.2d at
554.
42. Choice provisions are typically justified by the need to provide predictability to the
parties and to protect the parties' expectations. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 657 & nn. 1-3 (2d ed. 1992).
43. See id. at 660 n.2 (citing numerous cases). I do not mean to suggest that contractual
choice of law was an innovation of the 1970s; the clauses were enforced in some American
courts as early as the 19th century. See id. at 659 n.1. Nevertheless, both the use and en-
forcement of choice-of-law clauses have increased dramatically in the last few decades. See,
e.g., Kuehn v. Childrens Hosp., Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,
J.) ('Choice of law clauses are common and when reasonable are enforced.") (citing several
recent cases); Frietsch v. Refco Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (noting that
American courts have become hospitable to choice-of-law clauses). Judge Posner took the
converse position when he reasoned that because the parties omitted a choice-of-law provision
in their contract, no reasonable expectations would be frustrated by the court's choice-of-law
determination. Kuehn, 119 F.3d at 1302.
44. The First Restatement had been silent on the issue of choice of law. Its reporter, Jo-
seph Beale, condemned contractual choice of law as an attempt by the parties to legislate
privately. See Joseph Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III. Theoretical and
Practical Criticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L REV. 260, 261 (1910).
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(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relation to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to the
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
45
Subsection one of this provision governs default rules and is
relatively uncontroversial. The parties may write these specific
provisions into their contract, so subsection one merely enables
them to achieve the same result with a shorthand expression of
their preferred terms. 46 Subsection two treats contractual efforts to
avoid mandatory rules, those that the parties cannot circumvent in
a purely domestic relationship. This latter subsection calls into
question the extent to which parties in a multi-state context should
be entitled to opt out of otherwise mandatory regulations.
Section 187 is used to interpret statutes that are silent about
contractual choice of law; explicit legislative statements trump ap-
plication of the section. Recently, state statutes have addressed the
validity of choice-of-law provisions in a number of contexts. Most
well known is the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which en-
dorses the widespread use of choice-of-law clauses. Unless other-
wise provided, "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to
this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree
that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties."47 Unlike the Second Restate-
ment, the UCC presently does not explicitly enable a court to deny
enforcement of a choice-of-law clause on the ground that it would
violate a fundamental policy of a state closely connected to the
transaction. Elsewhere in the UCC, however, the drafters do indi-
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
46. See id. at cmt. c.
47. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1) (1999).
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cate some situations in which the use of contractual choice of law
should be more limited.4
In the last few years, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has incorporated a number of con-
tractual choice-of-law provisions into other proposed uniform laws.
The resulting statutes acknowledge a need for uniform and predict-
able laws in common multi-jurisdictional transactions. For exam-
ple, the UCC enables the parties to a funds transfer to choose their
governing law.49 The same is true for letters of credit,50 and broad
choices are available for investment securities intermediaries. 51 The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code recognizes limited use of choice-of-
law provisions in commercial leases.52 In addition, the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act provides that choice-of-law provisions
are valid for some purposes. 53 Some of these uniform law provisions
even eliminate the requirement that the law chosen bear a reason-
able relationship to the transaction or the parties, leaving contrac-
tual choice completely unfettered.54
In a similar vein, the American Law Institute is currently
considering a potentially broad expansion of contractual choice in
non-consumer contracts.55 While the proposal limits contractual
choice of law in consumer contracts to those jurisdictions where the
consumer resides or will use the contracted goods or services, 56 the
"reasonable relationship" test would be eliminated for non-
consumer contracts.57 Contractual choice in this latter category of
48. Under Article 2A, for example, the parties to a consumer lease may choose only the
law of the state in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement becomes enforce-
able or within 30 days thereafter, or the state where the goods will be used. U.C.C. § 2A-106(1)
(1999).
49. U.C.C. § 4A-507(b) (1999).
50. See U.C.C. § 5-116 (1999).
51. See U.C.C. § 8-110 (1999).
52. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.201(8) (1974), 7A U.L.A. 30 (1999).
53. UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTACT § 3(a)(7), 9B U.L.A_ 373 (1987).
54. See U.C.C. § 4A-507 cmt. 3 (1999) (funds transfers); U.C.C. §§ 5-116(a) & (e) (1999)
(letters of credit).
55. See U.C.C. Article 1 § 1-301, Discussion Draft (April 14, 2000).
56. See id. § 1-301(b) ("If one of the parties... is a consumer, the agreement is not effec-
tive unless the State or country designated is either: (1) the State or country in which the
consumer resides at the time the transaction becomes enforceable or within 30 days thereaf-
ter; or (2) the State or country in which, under the contract between the parties, the goods,
services, or other consideration flowing to the consumer are to be received or are used by the
consumer or a person designated by the consumer.").
57. Id. § 1-301(a) and note.
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contracts is left virtually unfettered,58 subject to a public policy ex-
ception 59 that the drafters contemplate would be invoked rarely.
60
In the absence of a legislative provision, the courts typically
apply section 187 of the Second Restatement to choice-of-law
clauses, and, in recent years, routinely enforce them. 61 Even in the
case of mandatory rules, courts are increasingly permitting the par-
ties to choose the set of state rules (or non-rules) that will govern
their relationship. Enforcement is by no means guaranteed, how-
ever, because the courts have taken varying positions on the en-
forcement of the clauses in individual contracting contexts.
A. State Law Examples
Usury provides a particularly interesting example of a man-
datory law that can be quite easily circumvented with a choice-of-
law provision. Usurious contracts are typically unenforceable, and
indeed, sometimes criminal.62 Moreover, under the First Restate-
ment of Conflicts, a state's usury laws were treated as reflecting its
strong public policy and were therefore entitled to respect by the
other states. 63 As a consequence, restricting states were not re-
quired to enforce usurious contracts, even though they were valid in
the place of contracting.64 Since the drafting of the Second Restate-
ment, however, the courts' view of usurious contracts has changed
58. Contractual choice would be restricted slightly in some non-consumer contracts. If
the contract bears no reasonable relationship to any foreign country, then the parties would be
required to choose the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. See id. § 1-301(d). Moreover, as with the
current UCC, party choice is sometimes limited in other parts of the Code. See id. § 1-301(e);
see also note ("Subsection (e), which is essentially identical to current UCC Section 1-105(2),
indicates that choice of law rules provided in other Articles govern when applicable.").
59. See id. § 1-301(c) ('An agreement ... is not effective to the extent that the law of the
State or country designated is contrary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose
law would otherwise govern.").
60. See id. at note.
61. See Symeonides, supra note 37 at 273 ("As in previous years, contract conflicts in
which the contract contains a choice-of-law clause are too numerous to mention, much less
discuss. The vast majority of these cases routinely uphold such clauses, often without much
discussion.").
62. See Pettit, supra note 15, at 290. See generally Susan Pannell McAllister, Judicially
Imposed Usury Penalties in the Absence of Statutory Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract Co-
Exist with Public Policy after Merritt v. Knox?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1021 (1990) (discussing and
critiquing North Carolina's treatment of usurious contracts); Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of
Modern Consumer Credit Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 157, 175 (1993-94) (quoting cases in which
the Court used biblical references to condemn usury contracts).
63. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) (stating the public policy excep-
tion).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971), note at 574 (1971)
(noting the courts' refusal to enforce usurious contracts under the First Restatement).
1564 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:5:1551
dramatically. In the last fifteen years, courts have almost uniformly
enforced choice-of-law provisions that enable the parties to evade
state usury laws. 65 Although many of these cases are litigated in
federal courts using their diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins66 and its progeny,67 a federal district court must
follow the choice-of-law precedents of the state where the district is
located.
Antenuptial agreements are also incorporating choice-of-law
provisions with mounting, albeit tentative, judicial support. When
two people decide to marry, they may have reasons to circumvent
their state's usual distribution of assets in the event of divorce or
death. In an antenuptial agreement, the betrothed couple attempts
to contract around a state's determination of fair distribution. 68 Ac-
cording to the drafters of the uniform law on prenuptial agree-
ments, the parties should be entitled to choose the law they prefer
to govern the interpretation of their contract. 69 Several courts have
gone further, however, and enabled the spouses to use choice-of-law
clauses to ensure the validity of their agreement.
70
States have varying requirements regarding the enforceabil-
ity of antenuptial agreements. Some states recognize antenuptial
agreements in contemplation of death, but are hostile to those
formed in contemplation of divorce. 71 Others recognize the validity
65. See, e.g., Jett Racing & Sales, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 892 F.
Supp. 161, 162-64 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Kinley Corp. v. Integrated Resources Equity Corp. (In re
Integrated Resources, Inc.), 851 F. Supp. 556, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Karl Rove & Co. v.
Thornburgh, 824 F. Supp. 662, 676 (W.D. Tex. 1993); American Honda Fin. Corp. v. GLOMC,
Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1157, 1159-60 (E.D. Ark. 1993); Capital Center Equities v. Estate of Gordon
(In re Capital Center Equities), 137 B.R. 600, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); Sumner Realty v.
Willcott, 499 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Exceptions typically involve the chosen law
of a state that has no substantial connection to the contract. See, e.g., Culbert v. Rols Capital
Co., 184 A..2d 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that if a company is only nominally operat-
ing in New Jersey to evade New York usury laws, the connection is insufficiently substantial
to justify the choice-of-law provision); Cook v. Frazier, 765 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App. 1989) (hold-
ing that the parties' attempt to create Utah connection was mere subterfuge to avoid Texas
usury laws).
66. Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal courts
sitting in diversity must follow the choice-of-law rules of the state); see also Day & Zimmer-
man, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (reaffirming the commitment to the Klaxon rule).
68. The state may develop distribution rules that are thought to accord best with the in-
tent of the parties. Likely, however, the courts will conclude that the married couple wanted a
"fair distribution," so the two inquiries are likely substantively equivalent.
69. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(7), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
70. See, e.g., Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 937, 942-44 (Conn. 1996); In re Estate of Massello,
No. 14613, 1997 WL 89091, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 1997); Carr v. Kupfer, 296 S.E.2d 560, 562
(Ga. 1982).
71. See id. at 561.
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of all antenuptial agreements, but place requirements on their for-
mation.72 State laws cover the need for notarization, witnesses, rep-
resentation by attorney or explicit waiver of that right, disclosure of
the assets of the parties in the agreement, and fundamental fair-
ness of the terms of the agreement at the time of the signing.73
These varying laws create potential choice-of-law difficulties, given
that one or both spouses may move to a new state by the time their
marriage is dissolved.7 4 Contractual choice of law might therefore
enable the spouses to rely on the validity requirements of a single
jurisdiction. Most courts that have decided the issue have expressed
a general willingness to enforce choice provisions, or at least those
clauses that will not result in manifest injustice.7 5
In contrast to their positions regarding usurious and ante-
nuptial agreements, a few states have refused to enforce choice-of-
law provisions in non-competition agreements between employers
and employees. 7 6  Typically, an employee who signs a non-
competition clause agrees that when he leaves his firm, he will not
compete with the employer or work for the employer's competitors
for a fixed period of time. Usually, the employer is concerned with
protecting trade secrets or other confidential information, and the
72. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 153-58 (1998)
(discussing varying substantive and procedural prerequisites to enforcement).
73. See, e.g., Elgar, 679 A.2d at 945-45 (holding under New York law, antenuptual
agreements are enforceable absent fraud, duress, or undue influence and separate representa-
tion is unnecessary where both parties were experienced business people and full financial
disclosure was made); Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding under Florida law, tearing up of an antenuptual agreement with intent that the
terms be no longer legally binding constitutes abandonment of the agreement); Penhallow v.
Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1020-21 (R.I. 1994) (holding under Rhode Island law, an uncon-
scionable premartial agreement was still enforceable absent proof of both involuntary execu-
tion and nondisclosure and/or waivers so long as it is in writing and signed by both parties).
74. Even under a single state's choice-of-law precedents, it may not be clear what law ap-
plies to their agreement. Compare In re Estate of Nicole Santos, 648 So.2d 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that place of contracting applied to antenuptual agreement), with Gustaf-
son, 515 So.2d at 1300 (rejecting the place of contracting rule for antenuptual agreements).
75. See, e.g., Elgar, 679 A.2d at 942-44 (applying the Second Restatement and determin-
ing that choice of New York law was valid); Carr, 296 S.E.2d at 562 ("Absent a contrary public
policy, this court will normally enforce a contractual choice of law clause."); Massello, 1997 WL
89091, at *3 ("Normally, a bargained-for choice-of-law contract provision will govern.").
76. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 41, at 668 ("Courts almost always strike down or mod-
ify such covenants if they violate the law of the employee's home state, despite stipulations in
the employment contract for a different law, on the ground that employees need protection
against the superior bargaining position of employers.").
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clause helps protect the employer's investment in training employ-
ees and developing customer relations. 7
State policies vary regarding enforcement of these non-
competition clauses. Most states will enforce a clause to the extent
that it is reasonable in geographic scope and duration. 78 However, a
few states further limit or deny their enforcement because they are
thought to harm competition for the provision of goods and services
within the state and to inhibit the employee's ex post earning poten-
tial.79 When the employing firm is headquartered in a state that
enforces non-competition clauses, but its employee is located in a
state that provides less or no protection for the employer, the firm
can attempt to protect itself with a choice-of-law clause.
Unfortunately, however, enforcement of these clauses often
turns on an ex post race to judgment. If the employer files a breach
of contract claim in the state whose law is contractually designated,
the court typically enforces the provision.80 After all, enforcement of
the non-competition clause benefits the in-state employer, and
courts typically prefer to apply forum law because it is more famil-
iar 8' and it generates precedent for use in future cases. 8 2 If the
claim is not filed in the employer's home state, however, enforce-
ment of the choice-of-law provision is unlikely in any case in which
enforcement of the non-competition clause turns on the governing
77. See Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that
an employer has a legitimate interest in safeguarding trade secrets and confidential customer
information).
78. See, e.g., Affiliated Paper Cos. v. Hughes, 667 F. Supp. 1436, 1445-50 (N.D. Ala.
1987); Hughes Assocs. v. Printed Circuit Corp., 631 F. Supp. 851, 855-58 (N.D. Ala. 1986);
Reed, Roberts, 353 N.E.2d at 593.
79. See, e.g., Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. v. Pokalsky, 490 S.E.2d 136, 139
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("Covenants against disclosure, like covenants against competition, affect
the interests of this state, namely the flow of information needed for competition among busi-
nesses, and hence their validity is determined by the public policy of this state."); DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (holding that Florida's choice-of-law provision
was properly ignored, given Texas' direct interest in (1) the employee in its state; (2) the em-
ployer doing business within its state; (3) the employee's new business within the state; and
(4) the consumers of services furnished within Texas); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastruc-
ture of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607-08 (1999)(discussing California's refusal to enforce non-
competition clauses against employees).
80. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1982); Shipley Co.
v. Kozlowski, 926 F. Supp. 28, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1996); JAK Prods. v. Wiza, No. IF 92-110-C,
1992 WL 472277, at *3 (S.D. Ind. March 11, 1992); Shipley Co. v. Clark, 728 F. Supp. 818, 825-
27 (D. Mass. 1990).
81. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law
Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1999).
82. See Francesco Parisi and Erin A. O'Hara, Conflict of Laws, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 387, 390 (1998).
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law. If, for example, the employee, perhaps with his new employer,
files a declaratory judgment action in the employee's state,83 the
court usually applies the public policy language of the Second Re-
statement to strike down the choice-of-law provision.84
Of course, the *case law is not entirely bereft of examples
where courts in the employee's state enforce choice-of-law provi-
sions. In virtually every one of these cases, however, the court notes
that the same result follows under application of either state's
laws.8 5 Because the state incurs no cost in applying the law that is
designated by the parties, respecting party autonomy impedes no
state policy. From the employer's perspective, however, the choice-
of-law provision does not assist in the enforcement of a non-
competition clause.
B. Federal Law Examples
The federal courts have increasingly enforced choice-of-law
and choice-of-forum 86 provisions in international transactions, even
when the provisions are used to evade federal law that might oth-
erwise regulate one of the parties. Indeed, the courts seem to recog-
nize that expansive and unyielding application of American law can
cost us significant international trade opportunities. As the Su-
preme Court has stated in the context of enforcing choice-of-forum
clauses, "[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
83. The same problem can arise if the court in the employer's home state lacks personal
jurisdiction over the employee. However, a choice-of-forum provision can solve this problem,
because the provision is very often treated as consent to jurisdiction.
84. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1030-31 (4th Cir.
1983); Marketing & Research Counselors, Inc. v. Booth, 601 F. Supp. 615, 617 (N.D. Ga. 1985);
Enron Capital, 490 S.E.2d at 139; DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677.
85. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1196 (8th Cir. 1992); Ferrofluidics
Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (1st Cir. 1992); Webcraft
Techs., Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (agreement upheld under
both); American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 361 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (both laws
the same); see also LCI Communications, Inc. v. Wilson, 700 F. Supp. 1390, 1396 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (involving no objections by either party to the application of Ohio law, as designated in
the contract).
86. Forum selection provisions are important because they can most often get parties into
a court that will enforce the choice-of-law provision. In fact, the Supreme Court endorses
recognition of choice-of-forum clauses while fully acknowledging that enforcement often means
that the parties have de facto chosen their own governing law. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 517 n.11 (1974) (arbitration clause); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 n.15 (1972).
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and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts."87
Using this reasoning, the seven circuits that have so far con-
sidered the issue all have determined that parties to international
transactions can use choice-of-law clauses to opt out of federal secu-
rities regulations, at least where the chosen country's law provides
some, albeit considerably less, right to relief.88 The securities regu-
lations provide an interesting example of contractual opt outs be-
cause the statutory language of both the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expressly disables the parties
from attempting to avoid their liabilities with direct contractual
waivers. For example, the 1933 Act states, "[a]ny condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."8 9 In the
process, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have also deter-
mined that the parties may use choice-of-law clauses to opt out of
their civil RICO liabilities,90 a somewhat surprising result, given
that, by definition, civil RICO only attaches when one has violated
a federal racketeering and organized crime statute that imposes
very harsh criminal penalties. 91
Of course, the federal courts, like the states, have not uni-
formly enabled parties to international transactions to opt out of
federal regulations. The Supreme Court has stated, at least in
dicta, that private parties will not be permitted to opt out of the
87. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
587-88, 593-94 (1991) (quoting The Bremen and enforcing a forum selection clause typewritten
on back of a ticket); Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 ("A contractual provision specifying in advance
the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indis-
pensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction.").
88. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1292-99 (11th Cir.
1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1292-96 (9th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v.
Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962-70 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928-30
(4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 159-62 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corpo-
ration of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360-66 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agen-
cies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956-58 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d
1227 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding forum-selection clauses enforceable despite the public policy
behind Ohio's securities statutes).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a substantially
similar restriction. See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994).
90. See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1299 n.20; Richards, 135 F.3d at 1296; Roby, 996 F.2d at
1366.
91. See Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1994).
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federal antitrust laws.9 2 Similarly, parties may not use choice-of-
law clauses to opt out of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.93 Moreo-
ver, many more contractual choice-of-law issues have yet to be
worked out fully by the courts. The increasing enforcement of
choice-of-law opt outs in general, coupled with the consequent un-
certainty of the enforcement of these opt outs in particular circum-
stances, should intensify the legislative focus on contractual choice
of law.
C. Academic Debate
The rise in the use and enforcement of choice-of-law clauses
has sparked debate among scholars over the desirability of enabling
parties to opt out of regulation. Early critics of the enforcement of
choice-of-law provisions objected to the idea on the grounds that the
clauses impermissibly restrict the regulating state's legislative ju-
risdiction.94 Until recently, proponents of contractual choice of law
focused on the practical benefits of letting the parties choose. After
all, contractual disputes are private rather than public, and pre-
dictability and certainty are especially important to contracting
parties. 95 Since, by definition, there is an inevitable conflict in the
laws of the possibly applicable jurisdictions, a choice-of-law clause
promotes certainty of party obligations and enables both the parties
and the courts to economize on litigation costs.9 6
92. See Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19
(1985) ("[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a
prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.").
93. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
94. See Richard J. Bauerfeld, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts
of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659, 1666-67 (1982);
Beale, supra note 43, at 261 C'[S]ince the parties can adopt any foreign law at their pleasure to
govern their act, [ ] at their will they can free themselves from the power of the law which
would otherwise apply to their acts."); Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New
York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 45; Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-
of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 248 (1958) (arguing that allowing the "incapacitated"
party to contract around capacity can subvert the interests of her domicile state); see also
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072,
1090 (1953) (disapproving the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses in adhesion contracts).
95. See Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the
Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 24 (1977).
96. See MICHAEL J. WMNCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 18 (forthcoming 2000) (arguing that party choice of law reduces transaction costs);
John Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison
of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 495
(1973) (discussing the position that contractual choice simplifies the judicial task while con-
tributing to certainty in commercial transactions); see also Donald T. Trautman, Some Notes
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In the last couple of years, a few conflicts scholars have ar-
gued that contractual choice of law can provide systemic benefits
for legal systems. In effect, party choice places competitive pres-
sures on jurisdictions to provide laws that appeal to the joint pref-
erences of the parties. Because the parties can choose their gov-
erning law prior to the time a dispute arises, the law they choose is
likely to be the law that best suits their individual relationship.
These latest proponents of choice-of-law clauses view them as likely
to promote more efficient laws in each jurisdiction. 97 Although this
literature is just now being published, critics are already rejecting
this "race-to-the-top" argument by characterizing choice of law as
ultimately creating a "race to the bottom."98
on the Theory of Choice of Law Clauses, 35 MERCER L. REV. 535, 541-42 (1984) (arguing that
the differing jurisdictions are attempting to solve the same problem anyway, often with func-
tionally equivalent means).
Recently, scholars have also pointed out that because parties and their transactions are
heterogeneous, contractual choice of regulatory regimes enables them to each choose the law
that is best suited to the particular transaction. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL.
L. REV. 903, 914-18 (1998).
97. See WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 95, at 18 (arguing that party choice of law pro-
motes competition among the states to provide better laws); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.
Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Competition, in FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 325 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (arguing that party choice leads to efficient laws); Erin
A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000); Michael J. Whincop & Mary E. Keyes, Statutes'Domains in Private Inter-
national Law: An Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory Rules, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 435,
436, 442-43 (1998) (arguing that attempts to avoid legal rules by contract "should not be
viewed pejoratively"); see also Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2395, 2402, 2410 (1998) (arguing that state regula-
tory competition should replace federal securities regulation and that the "choice of law clause
approach" will lead to more favorable securities laws); Paul B. Stephan III, Regulatory Coop-
eration and Competition-The Search for Virtue (visited Sept. 14, 2000)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/pa-per.tafabstract_id=169213> (arguing that under some circum-
stances, choice-of-law clauses can promote jurisdictional competition creating a race to the
top).
98. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure Why Issuer Choice is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (arguing that issuer choice of securi-
ties regulation will result in suboptimal disclosure to investors); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Pro-
tection Trusts: Trust Law's Race-to-the-Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1074 (2000) (noting
that foreign asset protection laws can be used by local defendants to shield their assets from
plaintiffs); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Securities Regulation (draft manuscript on file with author) (arguing that jurisdictional
competition in the securities context will create a race to the bottom); see also Stephan, supra
note 96 (acknowledging that choice-of-law clauses can help facilitate a race to the bottom).
For other critiques of contractual choice, see James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules For Interna-
tional Securities?, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1179, 1191 (1998) (arguing that because U.S. securities
laws are public rather than private law, they should not be subject to party choice); Darrell
Hall, Note, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting Parties to Opt Out of U.S. Securities
Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (1997) (arguing that Con-
gress intended securities laws to be mandatory).
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The roots of the "race-to-the-bottom" argument are visible in
the ideologically charged rhetoric of the Congressional supporters of
the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). 99 DOMA was Congress's
response to Hawaii's recognition of same-sex marriages. To the pro-
ponents of DOMA, who were quite openly hostile to same-sex mar-
riage,100 differing state marriage laws threatened to create de facto
party choice regarding marital status. If couples could go to Hawaii
to create a marriage, then states that wanted to compete for tourist
dollars would end up eroding other states' restrictions on same-sex
marriage. 10 ' DOMA purported to enable each state to deny marital
benefits to single-sex couples married elsewhere, 10 2 and it also de-
nied federal benefits to them. 03 DOMA's proponents were, in es-
sence, arguing that party choice would create a race to the bottom.
The proponents of the "race-to-the-top" argument discussed in the text each came to the
field of conflict of laws from the field of corporate law. The argument has its roots in the cor-
porate debate over corporate chartering. A corporation can choose to incorporate in any state,
regardless of whether it has any other connection to that state. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choos-
ing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 267-69 (1993) (discussing the difference between the
internal affairs rule and the conflicts rule applied to other business contracts). In essence,
then, corporate chartering is a form of contractual choice of law. See id. at 270. Many in the
field of corporations viewed corporate chartering as creating pressures for the states to com-
pete to provide efficient corporate laws. See generally Roberta Romano, Law as Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977); see also Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?: The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130 (1991) (discussing Canadian corporate law). Oth-
ers, however, viewed the competitive pressures as creating a "race to the bottom" in which the
states attract incorporation business by exploiting the principle-agent problems that result
from the separation of the ownership from the control of the corporation. See generally Wil-
liam Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUs. LAw 1125
(1976); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (discussing that some
areas of corporate law produce the race-to-the-bottom).
99. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. II 1996) & 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. II 1996)).
100. The House Report accompanying the bill stated that DOMA was a response to an "or-
chestrated legal assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights
groups and their lawyers." H.R. Rep. No. 664, at 2-3 (1996). The Report also quotes Represen-
tative Henry Hyde approvingly: "Same-sex marriage, if sanctified by the law ... trivializes
the legitimate status of marriage and demeans it by putting a stamp of approval ... on a un-
ion that many people ... think is immoral." Id. at 16. See generally Charles J. Butler, Note,
The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative In the Debate Over Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998) (quoting several polemical statements indicating that
DOMA was aimed to entrench view that same-sex marriage is immoral).
101. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 664, at 17 (1996) (noting the states' concern about their ability to
defend their marriage laws against the threat posed by the "Hawaiian situation").
102. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(Supp. II 1996)).
103. See Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. II 1996)).
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As is unfortunately clear in the case of DOMA, the debate
typically turns on the debater's normative views of the regulation at
issue. If regulation is desirable, then choice of law creates a race to
the bottom by eroding efforts to eliminate social harms. If regula-
tion is undesirable, then choice of law creates a race to the top by
promoting a state of minimalist restrictions on autonomy.104
Although the two sides of this debate disagree about whether
party choice of law represents a race to the top or to the bottom,
both sides seem to assume that party choice of law makes it more
difficult for states to regulate. The remainder of this article demon-
strates that, at least in the short run, precisely the opposite can be
true.
II. CONTRACTS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND OPT OUTS
More often than not, regulatory statutes are silent regarding
the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions. This silence can be the
result of rational calculation on the part of a statute's interest
group proponents for at least two reasons. First, silence can repre-
sent a political compromise necessary to ensure the enactment of
the regulation. Second, contractual opt outs can, under specified
conditions, serve to dissipate the costs rather than the benefits of
the law. In order to explain these phenomena, I first briefly de-
scribe the works of Ronald Coase, in section A, and Gary Becker, in
104. A similar debate is underway regarding the effects of jurisdictional competition for
the desirability of federalism. Compare William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New
Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World,
86 GEO. L.J. 201, 259 (1997) (arguing that jurisdictional competition works only under a very
narrow set of circumstances), Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority
Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 555-57 (1999)
(arguing that jurisdictional competition will erode efforts to redistribute wealth to the poor),
and Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 640 (1994) (noting that interjurisdictional spillovers and con-
sequent races to the bottom limit beneficial effects of regulatory competition), with Henry N.
Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 677, 707-12 (1988) (arguing that state competition of banking regulations
would be beneficial), Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26
J.L. & ECON. 23, 33-35 (1983), A.P. Hamlin, The Political Economy of Constitutional Federal-
ism, 46 PuB. CHoIcE 187, 189-91 (1985) (describing the public choice perspective of federalism
and its potential for both reducing political exploitation and satisfying heterogeneous demands
for public services), and Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1244-45 (1992) (arguing for a presumption favoring regulation at the state level). See
generally Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Compe-
tition, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996) (exploring the movement toward federalism in a variety of
contexts).
1572 [Vol. 53:5:1551
OPTING OUT OF REGULATION
section B. Section C details the influence of choice of law on inter-
est group bargains.
A. The Coase Theorem and Choice of Law
In a seminal article entitled The Problem of Social Cost,
Ronald Coase set forth the reasoning widely recognized today as the
Coase Theorem. 10 5 The article itself primarily addressed the prob-
lem of nuisance, or what Coase saw as the difficulties that arise
when competing land uses create or impose externalities on the
adjacent landowner(s). 1°6 Until Coase, economists typically thought
that the problem was best solved either with liability rules or with
Pigovian taxes.107 By charging the creator of the externality an
amount equivalent to the cost that she imposes on her neighbor(s),
the harming landowner is forced to internalize the costs of her nui-
sance and will thereby be given the incentive to engage in socially
efficient behavior. Coase identified two reasons why Pigovian taxes
would likely prove unsatisfactory. First, to Coase, the problem was
not one of a "bad guy" harming a "good guy," but rather one of
choosing among the most efficient of alternative land uses.108 Given
the difficulties of assessing relative inefficiencies in any context,
the government risks guessing incorrectly when it determines
which landowner should be taxed. Second, assuming that the gov-
ernment chooses the correct person to tax, assessing the appropri-
ate tax likely proves impossible. 109
Coase offered a much simpler and more efficient solution: as-
sign the property right to one of the landowners. In his article,
Coase uses the example of a railroad and a farmer who dispute over
105. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
106. Elsewhere, Coase defines "externalit'y" as:
the effect of one person's decision on someone who is not a party to that deci-
sion. Thus, if A buys something from B, A's decision to buy affects B, but this
effect is not considered to be an "externality." However, if A's transaction with
B affects C, D, and E, who are not parties to the transaction, because, for ex-
ample, it results in noise or smoke which impinge on C, D, and E, the effects on
C, D, and E are termed "externalities."
R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 24 (1990).
107. See Coase, supra note 104, at 1-2. The term 'Pigovian taxes" refers to the ideas set
forth in A. C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) and A. C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND
WELFARE (1912). An oral tradition by economists interprets Pigou's work as advocating that
one who creates a negative externality be taxed by the amount of harm that she causes. See
Coase, supra note 104, at 39-41.
108. Id. at 2.
109. See id. at 41-42.
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the emission of sparks by the trains. 110 The sparks destroy the
farmer's crops along a strip of land adjacent to the tracks, and the
Pigovian solution would be to tax the railroad the cost of the crop
damage. Coase argued that the issue is better framed as how best
to use the strip of land along the tracks."' Viewed in this manner,
an efficient result might more reliably be achieved by either (1)
giving the farmer the right to grow crops free from damage; or (2)
giving the railroad the right to emit sparks without compensating
for resulting damage. 112
Enter the Coase Theorem: The assignment of rights is criti-
cal, but the particular designee becomes irrelevant in the absence of
transaction costs. By replacing taxation with a property right, the
parties, who are better informed than the government, will bargain
to an efficient resolution of the problem. If it is worth more to the
railroad to emit sparks than it is to the farmer to be protected from
crop damage along the spark-vulnerable section of his field, then,
assuming the farmer holds the property right, the railroad will pay
the farmer for the right to emit sparks. If instead the farmer loses
more in crop damage than it would cost the railroad to prevent the
damage, then, assuming the railroad holds the property right, the
farmer will pay the railroad for the right to farm free of spark dam-
age. Of course, in both examples if the property right is apposite,
then no bargain is required to ensure the efficient outcome. The
assignment of the property right can affect the distribution of
wealth (i.e. whether money is transferred from railroad to farmer),
but not allocative efficiency (whether resources are put to their
most productive uses)." 3
Of course, bargaining is never costless, so the Coase Theorem
needs restatement to be useful: As long as transactions costs are
less than the gain to the parties from bargaining around the initial
assignment, the property rights solution induces an efficient resolu-
tion. From the perspective of an economist, the parties can undo an
inefficient rights allocation by choosing an alternative one. For ex-
ample, the railroad could pay the farmer in return for the farmer
signing a release promising not to sue for crop damage. Or, the rail-
road could purchase the strip of land that is vulnerable to damage
110. See id. at 29-34. Actually, the example originated with Pigou. See A. C. PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 134 (4th ed. 1932).
111. See Coase, supra note 104, at 34.
112. See id. at 6-8.
113. See id. at 10.
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from the trains. Presumably, Coase had in mind this direct type of
bargaining.
The conflicts scholar sees an alternative bargaining tech-
nique: The farmer and the railroad might enter into an agreement
which provides that all of their disputes will be resolved according
to the law of another state. To avoid the liability rule, they must
choose the law of a state that does not impose liability on railroads
for spark damage. Under either the direct bargaining or choice-of-
law clause solution, the farmer and the railroad are, in effect, opt-
ing out of the governing law. The choice-of-law clause option be-
comes attractive to the parties when the regulating state law treats
the liability rule as a mandatory rather than a default rule. If, for
example, the state where the farm is located refuses to enforce re-
leases, then their bargaining may only be feasible in the shadow of
an alternative state's law.
As always, to the rational decision maker, bargaining is only
worthwhile if the expected benefits to bargaining around the liabil-
ity rule exceed their costs. The expected benefits turn on the likeli-
hood that the choice-of-law provision will be enforced. As indicated
in Part I, under prevailing conflicts doctrine, the enforceability of
choice-of-law provisions is often uncertain.
Even if bargaining around the law produces gains to the con-
tracting parties, their agreement may not enhance social efficiency.
Some contracting is restricted to protect third parties from poten-
tial harms they might suffer.114 Suppose, for example, that a man
hires a hit man to murder his wife. The agreement might produce
large gains for the contracting parties, but contracting is neverthe-
less restricted to protect the targeted spouse. Similarly, contracts
that restrain trade are restricted to protect third party consumers.
And, to some extent, contracts for gambling or the sale of drugs are
prohibited to protect the moral sensibilities of the rest of society.
Coasean bargaining presupposes that all parties who may suffer
from the externalities of the proposed behavior are parties to the
114. Social efficiency might also be reduced because one of the individuals lacks the ca-
pacity to act as a rational decision maker. In these cases, the party thinks the bargain creates
gains for him, but the state has determined that the person's judgment cannot be trusted. See
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law And Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-43 (1998) (arguing that empirical evidence indicates that
people tend to underestimate negative risks in ways that call into question the "anti-
paternalism" position). See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION
OF RATIONALITY (1983) (arguing that preferences are often shaped by the very conditions that
a society wishes to eliminate).
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contract. If third parties are injured, then bargaining will not nec-
essarily produce an efficient result. 115
Alternatively, "efficiency," at least in a narrow economic
sense of wealth maximization, is not always the relevant objective.
An economist at a recent conference on environmental regulation
conveyed this point: "telling people recycling is inefficient is like
arguing that people shouldn't take communion because it is non-
nutritious."116 Laws may support or further some other important
value, such as altruism, personal autonomy, or the enjoyment of
natural beauty. To preserve these important non-efficiency objec-
tives, states may prevent the parties from bargaining around the
law.
Still other laws are aimed neither at efficiency nor at pro-
moting other social virtues, but rather are enacted to transfer
wealth. Coase dealt with the assignment of rights to force compet-
ing users to internalize the costs of their externalities. However,
some laws are not aimed at externalities. One of the lessons that
can be derived from the public choice literature is that sometimes
laws are inefficient because they are primarily intended to transfer
wealth from one group to another. People tend to gravitate toward
those activities that will yield them the highest benefits-and for
some, that means organizing to advocate laws that will benefit
themselves at the expense of others. These wealth-transferring
laws may be good or bad, fair or unfair. My point here is simply
that some will have an incentive to obtain legislative transfers, and
that those who stand to lose their wealth may have an incentive to
fight redistributive efforts.
As with some public choice literature, I separate "equalizing"
from "non-equalizing" wealth transfers. 117 Equalizing wealth trans-
fers are those intended to redistribute wealth from rich to poor that
can produce offsetting advantages that might make them desirable
115. Cf. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 332 (1979) ('If A and
B make a contract which benefits both parties it still cannot be deduced that the performance
of the contract will be in the public interest unless it is clear that the contract will not impose
any costs on third parties; or, more accurately, that it will not impose costs on third parties in
excess of any benefits conferred on third parties.").
116. Daniel K Benjamin, Remarks at the Free-Market Environmentalism Conference,
sponsored by the Political Economy Research Corporation, Bozeman, Montana (June 1999).
117. See William R. Dougan & James M. Snyder, Interest Group Politics Under Majority
Rule, 61 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 54-61 (1996) [hereinafter Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group Poli-
tics]; Erin A. O'Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A
Contractarian Explanation of the Role of the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869, 882-92 (1998).
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even to the rich who bear the costs of the transfers. 118 The remain-
der of this Article focuses instead on "non-equalizing" wealth trans-
fers, or those intended to transfer wealth in a fashion that does not
tend toward equality. An example of a non-equalizing redistribution
would be a tax that transfers wealth from employees of the garment
industry to people living in Texas, without regard to the wealth or
the incomes of the employees burdened or the Texans who benefit.
For non-equalizing wealth transfers, winners and losers can be ex-
pected to oppose one another in the legislative arena. In the public
choice literature, attempts to achieve these non-equalizing wealth
transfers are often referred to as "rent-seeking."119 The next section
elaborates on the theory of competition among interest groups. The
remainder of this Article explores the connection between this in-
terest group theory and choice of law.
B. The Interest Group Wrinkle
The legislature is itself a marketplace, and interest groups
compete with one another in that marketplace for legislative bene-
fits. 120 In this competitive process, as with all others, groups that
are more successful at creating benefits for themselves at low cost
are more likely to obtain the benefits that they seek.121 Laws there-
fore tend to benefit those groups that are able to (1) organize
cheaply and effectively; (2) prevent others from entering the group
to usurp a share of the benefits; and (3) minimize intra-group com-
petition that threatens to dissipate the proceeds obtained. 122
118. See O'Hara & Dougan, supra note 116, at 877-78 (arguing that under a broad range of
conditions, the rich will agree not to prohibit redistribution from wealthy to poor).
119. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 120-26 (1997);
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967)
(criticizing prior economic literature for its failure to account for the significant social costs
incurred in private efforts to obtain these rents).
120. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Po-
litical Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) [hereinafter Becker, Theory of Competition] (argu-
ing that competition for political favors helps to constrain deadweight costs associated with
legislation).
121. See id. at 395-96.
122. See generally William R. Dougan & James M. Snyder, Are Rents Fully Dissipated?, 77
PUB. CHOICE 793 (1993) [hereinafter Dougan & Snyder, Rents] (discussing conditions under
which interest groups can obtain legislative benefits without fully dissipating the potential
rents in the lobbying process); O'Hara & Dougan, supra note 116, at 889-92.
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Interestingly, unlike equalizing redistribution, non-
equalizing redistribution more often takes the indirect 123 form of
regulation than it does the more efficient form of direct 124 cash
transfers. 125 Economists have identified two reasons for the phe-
nomenon. First, indirect transfers may more likely fool the public
into believing that the law benefits the general public, 126 whereas
simply doling out cash can smack too strongly of political favorit-
ism. Second, indirect transfers make it easier for the beneficiaries
of the transfers to protect their proceeds. 127 Some regulations, like
occupational licensing requirements, are designed to keep out new-
comers who might attempt to benefit from the increased salaries
created by an artificially reduced supply of doctors, lawyers, archi-
tects, or other professionals. These licensing requirements may in
fact benefit the public; no doubt the most successful legislative ef-
forts have both a public interest component that appeals to voters
and a private interest component that creates incentives for strong
interest groups to push for the law. My point is simply that a li-
censing requirement may transfer more wealth to doctors than a
direct cash transfer because it limits the ability of outsiders to en-
ter the "doctor" group. Indirect transfers also can help the benefici-
aries prevent dissipation of their gain in a fight over how to dis-
tribute the proceeds of a fixed transfer within the group. Cash will
be fought over, but the indirect transfer has the allocation decision
already built into it.128 Under a physician-licensing requirement, for
123. Indirect transfers typically involve some form of regulation, such as licensing re-
quirements, price controls, price supports, and laws mandating or restricting particular busi-
ness practices.
124. Direct transfers involve cash payments to the members of the favored group. They
can involve direct cash payments as well as tax credits and deductions.
125. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 213-14 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 3, 4 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler, Regulation] (explaining why the oil
industry might prefer import quotas to cash subsidies).
126. See Gary Becker, Comment, 19 J.L. & ECON. 245, 246 (1976) [hereinafter Becker,
Comment] (noting that indirect transfers are commonly explained by voter ignorance); see also
Philip Nelson, Political Information, 19 J.L. & ECON. 315, 323 (1976) (discussing the "domi-
nant view" that voter ignorance explains indirect transfers).
127. See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 333 (4th ed. 1987) C'The fact that
cash transfers, which seem simple and efficient, are used relatively little compared to control
of entry of firms, provision of public education, and so on suggests that to identify beneficiaries
and police cash grants is often expensive."); Becker, Comment, supra note 125, at 247-48 (ar-
guing that if interest groups prefer regulation, it must be the relatively efficient means by
which to transfer benefits to interest groups). See generally Dougan & Snyder, Rents, supra
note 121 (discussing policy designs that are most likely to enable interest groups to reap posi-
tive benefits).
128. See Dougan & Snyder, Interest Group Politics, supra note 116, at 63-64; O'Hara &
Dougan, supra note 116, at 891-92.
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example, doctors can reap super-competitive profits, and each doc-
tor can affect the amount of profits she receives by choosing the
quantity and identity of her patients and the location of her prac-
tice. However, the means by which the doctors can earn these prof-
its is already contained in the form of the transfer, so subsequent
squabbling over the proceeds of the wealth transfer is eliminated.
Because laws are skewed in favor of those that have a com-
parative advantage in rent-seeking, not all laws will be socially effi-
cient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense that the winners gain more than
the losers suffer. 129 Certainly, we would expect some efficient laws
to be enacted, especially those that entail few or no losers, because
legislators who propose such laws gain political support from the
voters. 30 For example, we would expect the legislature to enact a
law that coordinates drivers by requiring that everyone drive on the
right (left) side of the road because virtually everyone gains from
this coordination, and losers suffer relatively little. In addition to
efficient laws, however, we can also expect inefficient ones.
Gary Becker's important insight was that inefficient transfers
tend to be efficiently inefficient-a sort of silver lining for the oth-
erwise "dismal science" of economics. In general, the higher the
costs a transfer imposes on taxpayers or others, the more they have
an incentive to organize to fight that transfer.'3 ' So, interest groups
have an incentive to minimize the costs that the transfer imposes
on others in order to minimize opposition to the proposed law.
Economizing on the transfer costs increases the likelihood that the
legislation will pass, both because the transferees can obtain the
transfer cheaply with no or little opposition (so it is worth at-
tempting), and because the legislator needs to worry less about loss
of potential political support than she would otherwise.
C. The Influence of Choice of Law on Interest Group Bargains
What does interest group theory have to do with choice of
law? As Part I established, contracting parties may opt out of an
increasing number of otherwise mandatory laws by choosing the
129. For a definition and further discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concept, see
RICHARD A- POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16 (4th ed. 1992).
130. Cf. Becker, Theory of Competition, supra note 119, at 396 C'Policies that raise effi-
ciency are likely to win out in the competition for influence because they produce gains rather
than deadweight costs, so that groups benefited have the intrinsic advantage compared to
groups harmed.").
131. See id. at 395 (arguing that increased dead weight costs of regulation discourage in-
terest group proponents while encouraging taxpayer opposition).
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law of a non-regulating jurisdiction. As at least implicitly recog-
nized by both sides of the contractual choice of law debate, evasion
can make the law significantly less valuable to its proponents. Does
this fact imply that contractual choice of law, as a mechanism to opt
out of mandatory rules, will inevitably undermine the interests of
regulatory supporters? Not necessarily. Of course, the debate indi-
cates that one's view on choice-of-law clauses depends upon one's
opinion about whether the mandatory rule at issue represents
sound policy. This section establishes that, as a positive matter, the
normative analysis is more complex than apparently presupposed
by both sides of the debate. Under some circumstances, regulatory
proponents would embrace contractual opt outs, while Libertarians
might condemn them as counterproductive.
Until now the debaters have focused almost exclusively on
the ex post effects of choice of law on regulation. That is, once the
law has been enacted, what does a choice-of-law clause do to the
effectiveness of the law? This Article calls attention to the ex ante
influence of choice of law on the incentives it creates for interest
groups to lobby for or against potential laws. The addition of this ex
ante focus can complicate one's normative views about the desir-
ability of opting out of the law in question. Contractual choice of
law can have significant but sometimes ambiguous effects on the
incentives of interest groups to obtain or defeat potential legisla-
tion. In some cases, the ability to opt out of a law makes it easier to
pass, and the opt out can help minimize the dead weight cost of
transfers that are incurred by both the winners and the losers, as
well as by the taxpayers. Figure 1 helps to illustrate how contrac-
tual choice of law can increase the likelihood of regulation.
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I FavoredIn Figure 1, a decision tree helps the reader to distinguish
the current debate from the norattive conclusions that result from
an ex ante iniu auto the problem. The tree presents a stylized
version of the thought process of a decision maker who ponders
whether to favor or oppose contractual choice of law. I assume that
the decision maker's normative conclusion turns critically on a
subjective assessment of the merits of the underlying law. In other
words, the question she must answer is, "do I think parties should
be permitted to opt out of law X with a choice-of-law clause?"
Moreover, for purposes of the analysis, I as s u m e that her answerdepends upon whether she likes the effects that law X has on soci-
ety. The decision maker could apply any criterion that she prefers
to answer this latter question, whether it is social wealth, social
welfare, individual autonomy, fairness, self-interest, or some other
objective. Her conclusion about the desirability of the law is repre-
sented in the first branching of the decision tree. One who believes
that the law is good travels the upper branch, while one who con-
demns the law travels the lower branch.
Some scholars view the question more broadly, by considering
whether, as a general policy matter, choice-of-law clauses should be
enforced in the context of mandatory rules. 132 At the risk of grossly
oversimpliyng political positions, I place "Social Conservatives"
132. See, e.g., WMINCOP & KEYES, supra note 95, at 18; Beale, supra note 43, at 261; Koba-
yashi & Ribsein, supra note 96, at 325 (arguing that party choice leads to efficient laws).
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and "New Dealers" on the top branches and "Libertarians" along
the lower branches. Thus, those who believe that regulations are
typically beneficial find themselves traveling along the upper
branches, while those who believe that regulations are typically
detrimental find themselves traveling along the lower branches.
After assessing whether the underlying law(s) is beneficial,
the decision maker must then determine whether the choice-of-law
issue is properly viewed ex ante, meaning before the passage of the
law in question, or ex post, once the law has come into effect. This
assessment is represented by the second set of branching in both
the upper and lower branches of the decision tree. If the decision
maker evaluates a particular statute, then the appropriate focus
turns on whether the law in question has yet been enacted. If, for
example, the decision maker is an interest group, deciding whether
to lobby the legislature for a prohibition on opting out of a proposed
regulation would entail an ex ante inquiry. In contrast, deciding
whether parties should be permitted to opt out of existing regula-
tion entails an ex post inquiry. If, instead, the decision maker is
viewing the issue from a more general perspective, then he may
need to consider both the ex ante and ex post effects to determine
whether, on net, he believes that contractual choice of law is desir-
able. Although the general inquiry ultimately may require a joint
consideration of these two perspectives, they are separated in the
decision tree to contrast the current debate with the ex ante focus
added by this Article.
Those who have opposed choice-of-law clauses based on their
favorable views of existing regulation(s), the "New Dealers" and
"Social Conservatives," are located at node 3. In contrast, those on
the other side of the present debate, the "Libertarians," are located
at node 6. Recall that the "Libertarians" view choice of law as a
mechanism to dampen the effects of particular laws and to foster
jurisdictional competition that encourages deregulation.
Nodes 3 and 6, taken together, represent a dichotomy that
also can be viewed in terms of social welfare by returning to the
discussion of Coasean bargaining from Part II.A. Recall that Coase
was concerned with the problem of nuisance, or interfering land
uses. By assigning a property right, the state forces the neighboring
landowners, through the process of bargaining, to internalize the
costs that their preferred behavior imposes on other(s). If, as Coase
assumed, those individuals with conflicting interests are all repre-
sented in subsequent bargaining, then they can, if transaction costs
are low enough, adopt an efficient solution on their own. From this
Coasean perspective, then, regulation becomes the state's best
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guess about how the parties' relationship is most reasonably or-
dered. If the regulation does not suit the parties to a particular con-
tract, then they should be permitted to bargain around the law to
reach their own more efficient solution. If the assumptions hold,
then those concerned with social welfare maximization are located
at node 6. In this Coasean world, the existence of the legal rules
may be desirable, but only to the extent that they function as de-
fault rules.
Consider now those regulations for which Coase's assump-
tions do not hold. As mentioned in Part II.A, some regulations that
restrict contracting are justified by third party concerns. Suppose,
then, that the contracting parties are not those that the regulation
intends to protect, so that Coasean bargaining is not likely to yield
optimal results. One would be hard pressed to argue, for example,
that the hit man and the husband should be permitted to opt out of
a prohibition on their contract, because their bargaining does not
take into account the harm to the wife (or the rest of us) from per-
formance. Here, the "property right," as represented by the prohibi-
tion, belongs to the wife and perhaps also the greater community,
so that Coasean bargaining only works if the wife, along with any-
one else who suffers from the killing, is party to the agreement. Be-
cause such inclusive contracting is highly unlikely, if indeed it is
possible, 133 one might quite reasonably take a node 3 position re-
garding murder-for-hire contracts.
Of course, this example seems unrealistic because no jurisdic-
tion is likely to enforce murder-for-hire contracts, and the very ef-
fort to enforce such an agreement subjects one or both of the parties
to the risk of severe criminal sanctions in their home state. Choice-
of-law provisions, therefore, will not likely create effective means by
which to opt out of universal prohibitions. But, gambling, prostitu-
tion, and other contractual prohibitions are often defended by a de-
sire or need to protect the preferences of third parties. For example,
a gambling addiction could leave the gambler's family destitute,
prostitution facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, and
both activities offend the moral sensibilities of other members of
the community. At the same time, states differ dramatically in their
attitudes toward these activities. The more direct and severe the
negative effects of these activities on third parties located in the
regulating state, the more likely the contractual choice-of-law deci-
sion is located at node 3 rather than node 6.
133. Individuals who suffer from the awareness that this bargain facilitates suicide pre-
sumably would not agree to allow the parties to contract around the prohibition.
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In contrast to the ex post considerations of nodes 3 and 6,
consider now the issue from an ex ante perspective. Keeping in
mind Becker's important insight that successful interest groups
economize on the costs of their proposed laws, how does contractual
choice of law affect the incentives of interest groups to advocate or
resist the enactment of regulation? The ex ante inquiry is important
because those opposed to regulation prefer to minimize interest
group incentives to advocate the laws while simultaneously maxi-
mizing incentives to resist regulatory efforts. In fact, regulatory
opponents much prefer that legal efforts be thwarted altogether
than that they be dampened after enactment by choice of law. Of
course, those in favor of regulation prefer the converse-to maxi-
mize incentives to advocate the proposed law and to minimize po-
tential opposition.
1. Continuing wealth transfers
Returning to our inquiry, how does the possibility of contrac-
tual choice of law affect the likelihood that a proposed law will be
enacted in the first place? First, suppose that the law can be ex-
pected to provide benefits and impose costs over a number of future
periods, at least when people cannot opt out of the law. Consider,
for example, a proposed state law prohibiting gambling. Some
groups will favor the prohibition, perhaps including some churches,
individuals who think wagering is immoral, some family members
of gambling addicts, and the state agency that administers the lot-
tery to help pay for education. Others will oppose the prohibition,
perhaps including providers of gambling services and equipment,
black market lenders, and those who enjoy wagering. Both the
benefits and the costs that result from the prohibition would flow
periodically, over the life of the prohibition. Each side can form in-
terest groups to take its cause to the legislature, and, depending on
the balance of political powers, the proposed law is either likely to
pass or to fail.
Now suppose an additional fact: the citizens who wish to
gamble can do so over the Internet by contracting with an outfit
that is physically located outside of the jurisdiction. When the indi-
vidual enters the gambling site, she clicks past a screen that states
that by entering, the individual agrees that the law of some speci-
fied non-regulating jurisdiction applies to the gambling relation-
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ship. Suppose that this "contractual choice" is enforceable.13 4 How
does this possibility of regulatory evasion affect the likelihood that
a prohibition on gambling will be enacted?
Without more information, it is unclear whether opting out
raises or lowers the likelihood of enactment. The ability to opt out
clearly makes the law less valuable, which diminishes the incentive
for interest groups to organize and lobby for its passage. On the
other hand, the possibility of evasion also decreases the incentives
for opponents to fight its enactment. The easier it is to opt out of
the restriction, the stronger will be the effect on each interest
group's incentives, but regardless of the strength of these effects,
they will run in the same direction for both proponents and oppo-
nents. No doubt, all outcomes depend upon relative elasticities, or
responsiveness to changed circumstances, and here too, the enact-
ment of the law may well turn on which side's incentives are more
severely dampened by the possibility of opting out. 13 5 But, without
more detailed information about those elasticities, the decision
maker is unable to determine whether contractual choice of law
would be desirable from the ex ante perspective. Thus, if the deci-
sion maker desires the prohibition (a "Social Conservative"), he
finds himself at node 1. If he opposes the prohibition (a "Libertar-
ian"), he finds himself at node 4.
To the outside observer, contractual choice of law ambigu-
ously affects the likelihood of regulation. But the interest groups
themselves likely have superior information about both their own
and their opponents' incentives, and may therefore be much better
able to assess whether the opt out increases or decreases the likeli-
hood of enactment. Proponents who fear that their law will be de-
feated may acquiesce on opting out by not proposing that it be pro-
hibited in the legislation. They may prefer to press the issue later,
by arguing to the courts that the opt out offends public policy under
134. One state court has stated that internet gambling violates both New York State and
federal law. See People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., No. 404428/98, 1999
WL 591995, at *6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999) (discussing, inter alia, the Federal Interstate
Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). However, a similar analysis applies to any possibility short of
certainty that the opt out is effective. The stronger the likelihood of successful evasion, the
stronger the effects on the opposing interest groups.
135. Of course, the relative effects only matter at the margin. It may be the case both that
(1) the Nevada casinos have much less incentive to oppose a gambling prohibition if they can
opt out of it, and (2) gambling opponents' incentives to seek a prohibition in Nevada are di-
minished, but by less than the casinos. Nevertheless, the Nevada casinos and other gambling
interests may have so much at stake in either event that the law is doomed even with the
possibility of opting out.
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section 187 of the Second Restatement. 13 6 Of course, the proponents
run the risk that, after enactment, the courts will ultimately en-
force choice-of-law provisions. But, the compromise might be neces-
sary to ensure that the law is enacted. This political compromise
becomes a partial answer to the question posed in the Introduction:
why don't interest group proponents of regulation always attempt
to include a prohibition on contractual choice of law?
This ex ante inquiry has so far implicitly assumed that the
proposed law will impose costs on the losers over a number of peri-
ods and that the losers can evade the costs in future periods with
an enforceable choice-of-law clause. Not all laws fit this pattern,
however, and the remainder of this Article focuses on an alternative
possibility: some laws effectively transfer wealth to their benefici-
aries only during a single period. These one-shot transfers are rep-
resented at node 4 of the decision tree.
2. Single-period transfers
Recall from Part II.B that rent-seeking most often takes the
form of regulation that promises to create super-competitive profits
for interest group members. In some cases, this wealth transfer oc-
curs in a single period, even though the statute remains on the
books for many years. Wealth transfers can be limited to a single
period if the losers can avoid future transfers with a choice-of-law
clause. Of course, if the transfer shifts wealth between two con-
tracting parties, then the burdened party might prevent future
transfers in other ways, including by altering the terms of future
contracts. Suppose, for example, that a new law requires landlords
to refund security deposits to their tenants along with a ten percent
annual rate of interest. Under existing lease agreements, assuming
no constitutional constraints, 137 wealth is transferred from land-
lords to tenants. However, if landlords can pass their costs back to
the tenants by raising the rent in future lease agreements, the
wealth transfer is confined to a single period. 138
136. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 187 (discussing constitutional treatment of application of franchise
termination laws to existing contracts). Notice that these constitutional constraints can sig-
nificantly limit rent-seeking.
138. I am not the first lawyer to observe that legal efforts to transfer wealth between con-
tracting parties can quickly become futile. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributional and Paternal-
istic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Une.
qual Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 612, 617-18 (1982) (arguing that efforts to trans-
fer wealth from sellers to buyers can work only in limited circumstances). Richard Craswell
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Alternatively, regulation may be sufficiently onerous that
those burdened can credibly threaten to exit the jurisdiction. Sev-
eral credit card companies, for example, have relocated to South
Dakota and Delaware, in order to avoid interest rate caps in other
states.139 Those caps worked to the detriment of the credit card
companies, especially when coupled with caps on late payment fees,
but the companies were able to shed future costs through exit.
When the contract terms are altered or the loser credibly
threatens to exit the state, the choice-of-law provision is not af-
fecting future wealth transfers to the beneficiaries because, by defi-
nition, there are none. In these circumstances, choice-of-law clauses
serve a different function; they minimize the dead weight costs as-
sociated with the law. All transfers generate dead weight losses,
which represent the lost surplus to both parties that results from
legal alteration of their relationship. 140 A warranty of habitability,
for example, might transfer wealth from landlords to tenants for at
least a single period, and that transfer might represent "good" or
"bad" policy, but it will also entail costs that neither party can re-
coup. Landlords lose the producer surplus (profits that could have
been spent elsewhere) that came from lower maintenance costs.
Tenants, who-find that landlords have raised rents to cover these
added expenses, lose the consumer surplus that came from spend-
ing this additional income on alternative items. Because contrac-
tual choice of law helps to minimize these dead weight costs, it has
the effect of dampening opposition to the proposed law without a
corresponding diminution of the incentives to seek single-period
wealth transfers. In these circumstances, the possibility of opting
out of the law makes its enactment more rather than less likely.
has argued that one indication of consumer benefit from a legal rule is the ability of sellers to
pass on their costs, because the greater the consumer surplus created, the better able the
seller is to charge for the costs it incurs from the legal change. See Richard Craswell, Passing
on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43
STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991). The converse is also true: The more inefficient the transfer, the
less the transferor is able to recoup the costs of the transfer. My point is narrower. To the
extent possible, the transferor will take back the transferee's gains from the transfer.
139. See David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution,
Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 333 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision that "created an enormous incentive for credit card issuers to move their operations to
states with high usury caps and for state legislatures [like Delaware and South Dakota] to
ease or eliminate their consumer-credit usury laws"); Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card De-
faults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 260-61 (1997) (same);
Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of
the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 685-86 (1987) (same).
140. See STIGLER, supra note 126, at 332.
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Returning to the decision tree in Figure 1, if the decision
maker favors this single-period wealth transfer, then from an ex
ante perspective she would prefer to allow contracting parties to opt
out of the law. If she instead opposes the law, then permitting the
parties to opt out of the law only makes matters worse for her. The
former decision maker finds herself at node 2, and the latter at
node 5. Node 5 represents yet a second category of proposed laws
whose proponents would not be expected to advocate a prohibition
on choice-of-law clauses. As with the political compromise category,
the proponents are omitting the choice-of-law prohibition to maxi-
mize the likelihood that the law is passed. But here the omission
represents no compromise; instead, both proponents and opponents
prefer ex post to be able to opt out of the law.
The next Part elaborates on this category of one-time trans-
fers using state franchise termination laws as a possible example.
Franchise termination laws are intended to benefit franchisees at
the expense of franchisors, so they serve as a useful illustration of
how some laws effect only single-period transfers. Moreover, fran-
chise contracts provide a useful example of how contractual choice
of law can sometimes be used to minimize the continuing dead
weight losses associated with regulation. Although I will be as-
suming throughout most of Part III that these regulations were de-
signed to transfer wealth rather than to promote fairness by elimi-
nating disparities in bargaining power, I will return to the difficulty
of distinguishing between the two at the end of Part III. In reality,
state franchise regulations likely were motivated by both concerns.
And, ultimately, the analysis is both consistent with and relevant to
either explanation of these laws.
III. ONE-SHOT WEALTH TRANSFERS AND FRANCHISE
REGULATIONS
A. The Franchise Form
Franchising, as a business form,'4 1 has become a common
means by which companies bring their products and services to the
141. According to the United States Department of Commerce, franchising takes two
forms. The first, product and trademark franchising, entails "an independent sales relation-
ship between supplier and dealer in which the dealer acquire[s] some of the identity of the
supplier." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1985-87 1 (1987). The
second, business-format franchising, is "characterized by an ongoing business relationship
between franchisor and franchisee that includes not only the product, service and trademark,
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consumer. The franchise form is a hybrid that lies between two
more traditional marketing strategies. First, a manufacturer can
own the retail stores that deliver its goods to market. An employee
who captures only a modest share of the store's profits manages a
company-owned store, and the manager's incentives therefore are
not aligned with the profit-maximizing goals of the company. 142
Consequently, the manufacturer inevitably incurs agency costs as-
sociated with unit managers' shirking and perquisite-taking. 4 3
Alternatively, the manufacturer could sell its goods to inde-
pendently owned and managed retailers. Each retailer is motivated
to maximize its sales and profits, but retailers are also likely to free
ride off the manufacturer's trademark and to shirk on trademark
enhancement. The independent retailer incurs only a portion of the
costs if he diminishes the trademark by providing low quality serv-
ice, product delivery, repairs, or advertisements, while the manu-
facturer bears the full cost of reduced consumer goodwill. 14 These
agency costs are larger for retailers who transact primarily with
transient, rather than repeat, customers. 14 Often, neither of these
two traditional business forms provides a satisfactory means for the
manufacturer to maximize profits.
The franchise relationship steers a middle course between
these two forms that can help many companies to better control
agency costs than they could by relying primarily on either com-
pany-owned or independently-operated retailers. 146 Franchisees
but the entire business format itself-a marketing strategy and plan, operating manuals and
standards, quality control, and continuing two-way communications." Id. at 3. Throughout
this Part, I focus on the latter franchising category.
142. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-23 (1976) (comparing the
behavior of a manager who owns all of the residual claims on a firm to one who earns less than
all of this firm's profits); see also D. L. Noren, The Economics of the Golden Arches: A Case
Study of the McDonald's System, 34 AM. ECONOMIST 60, 62 (1990) (noting that McDonald's
decision to franchise was influenced by the poor entrepreneurial incentives of company run
stores).
143. See James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form, 18 J.
FIN. ECON. 401, 404-05 (1987).
144. See Richard L. Smith H, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restric-
tions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 126-27 (1982) (discussing incentive
problems associated with independently-owned automobile dealerships).
145. See James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34
J.L. & ECON. 101, 130 (1991).
146. Paul Rubin apparently was the first to offer the agency cost explanation for franchis-
ing. See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract,
21 J.L. & EcoN. 223, 226-30 (1978). Prior to Rubin, franchising was typically explained as a
mechanism enabling the franchisor to raise capital quickly. See id. at 325-26. Most econo-
mists find the agency cost explanation more satisfactory. See, e.g., Brickley & Dark, supra
note 142, at 403 (discussing an empirical study supporting the agency cost theory of franchis-
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own their businesses, most often own or lease all of the capital as-
sets that they use, and are the residual claimants of store profits. 147
At the same time, the franchisee cedes some of its decision making
control to the franchisor to enable the franchisor to maintain the
value of its trademark. 148 Typically, the franchisor provides the
marketing concept, product development, service procedures, oper-
ating manuals, employment manuals, and quality standards. 149
Franchisors may also provide or dictate the standards for or suppli-
ers of equipment, product supplies, employee uniforms, mainte-
nance, insurance, bookkeeping, real property, and other franchise
needs.150
Of course, no solution perfectly controls agency costs. Moni-
toring by the franchisor is costly, and perfect monitoring impossi-
ble, so that some free riding on the value of the trademark
remains. 1 1 Moreover, franchisees who have sunk the bulk of their
assets into running the franchise will have undiversified portfolios
creating risk averse investment decisions that can be suboptimal. 152
In fact, the vast majority of companies that rely on franchising re-
tain some stores as company-owned. Consistent with the agency
theory of franchising, empirical research indicates that companies
tend to franchise those units where monitoring of the unit manag-
ers is more difficult. A company is therefore more likely to franchise
those stores that are located far from company headquarters and
those that are in less densely populated areas (making the units
farther apart from one another).1 3
Although less than an ideal business form, franchising grew
at staggering rates in the United States between 1972 and 1986.
Total nominal sales through franchise outlets grew by 442 percent,
while the number of outlets grew by 65 percent during the same
period, from 189,640 to 312,810.154 By 1987, franchise contracts ac-
ing); Smith, supra note 143, at 126 (arguing that the capital-raising explanation fails to ex-
plain why a franchise continues to exist after the capital shortage is resolved).
147. See Gillian M. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 934 (1990).
148. See id. at 932; Smith, supra note 143, at 127. See generally G. Frank Mathewson &
Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985) (explain-
ing the use of franchise contracts and making predictions from a model to account for vari-
ability in such contracts).
149. See Hadfield, supra note 146, at 933.
150. See id. at 933 n.29.
151. See Brickley & Dark, supra note 142, at 404.
152. See id. at 405.
153. See id. at 411-19.
154. See Patrick J. Kaufnann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Eco-
nomic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417, 418 (1994).
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counted for one-third of all retail sales in the United States. 155
Franchising businesses continue to evolve, and some of the more
well-known franchises include fast food restaurants, clothing and
shoe stores, convenience stores, car rentals, real estate brokers, tax
and accounting service providers, and employment agencies. 156
B. Franchise Protection Laws
With this growth in franchises came a concern in several
states that the large national franchisors were engaging in post-
contractual opportunism against small, local franchisees. 157 Because
franchisees typically are required to sink relatively large invest-
ments up front, 158 franchisees voiced concern that franchisors would
exploit that investment by raising prices, forcing franchisees to
make unnecessary renovations, or usurping successful franchises. 159
In short, to their proponents, franchise termination laws were nec-
essary to correct a disparity in bargaining power between franchi-
sors and franchisees that made it impossible for the franchisees to
bargain individually for these protections. 160
In eighteen states, franchisees had sufficient local political
clout to obtain legislation protecting them from harsh actions by
franchisors. 161 Sixteen states passed statutes preventing franchise
termination without cause.162 Ten of those states also require cause
for non-renewal of the franchise contract. 16 In addition, ten states
mandate that any franchisee who is not in compliance with the
state's contract requirements be given a reasonable period to cure
any defects.164
155. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 140, at 14; Hadfield, supra note 146, at 928.
156. See Hadfield, supra note 146, at 934-36.
157. See id. at 951-53.
158. See id. at 934 (listing estimated initial capital requirements for various franchises).
159. See id. at 951-53. On the general problem of post-contractual opportunism, see Ben-
jamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297-98 (1978), and Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 235-38 (1979).
160. I consider here only those franchise regulations that affect the contractual relation-
ship between franchisor and franchisee. This Article does not consider other franchise laws
that may regulate franchisee-consumer relations, franchisee-salesman relations or salesman-
consumer relations. See Smith, supra note 143, at 139 (noting that these alternative types of
regulations exist for automobile franchises).
161. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 96, at 446 n.104.
162. See id. at 446 n.106.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 340 & n.107. Other statutory provisions appear to mimic contractual terms
rather than imposing new ones. These latter regulations appear to ensure monopoly territo-
ries for franchisees by preventing franchisor encroachment. See Smith, supra note 143, at
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Economists have argued that these regulations are not neces-
sary to protect the franchisees. The predation theory appeared in-
consistent with the strong demand for new franchise opportunities.
McDonald's, for example, only accepts between two and seven-and-
one-half percent of the more than 2000 franchise applications sub-
mitted annually.165 Empirical evidence supports the theorists' sup-
positions, 166  demonstrating that the opportunities for super-
competitive profits drive the demand among prospective franchi-
sees.16 7 Further evidence weakens the predation theory. In 1986, an
estimated 80 percent of the contracts extended the franchise for a
period between five and twenty years. 168 Nearly 65 percent of the
contracts included terms between ten and twenty years. These
longer periods are presumably intended to be commitments by fran-
chisors to refrain from acting opportunistically against franchisees
with sunk investments. 169
Franchisors could still threaten to terminate an existing con-
tract because many franchise contracts permit termination at-
will.17o At-will termination enables franchisors to maintain more
effectively the value of the franchise trademark by monitoring fran-
chisee free riding. Franchise contracts cannot feasibly specify all
franchise duties, and franchisees can shirk in ways that are diffi-
133-35, 138-39 (discussing automobile dealer licensure requirements and restrictions on cre-
ating new dealerships or competing directly with franchisees). These provisions appear to be
consistent with the public choice theory of regulation as industry cartelization, as pointed out
by Stigler in Regulation, supra note 124. I do not consider these statutory provisions in this
Article.
165. See Kaufinann & Lafontaine, supra note 153, at 418 (quoting Barbara Marsh, Going
for the Golden Arches, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1989, at B1); see also Noren, supra note 141 (dis-
cussing the McDonald's franchise relationship and requirements).
166. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 147, at 513-14 & n.15, 525 (noting long queues
of potential franchisees and presenting a model predicting that franchisees will earn "rents" in
equilibrium); Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,
23 RAND J. ECON. 263, 281 (1992) (noting empirical data on the relationship between royalty
rates and franchise fees suggests the possibility that franchisors purposefully enable franchi-
sees to earn rents).
167. See generally Kauflnann & Lafontaine, supra note 153 (providing an empirical study
indicating that McDonald's franchisees earn "rents").
168. See Hadfield, supra note 146, at 937 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note
140, at 13).
169. See Brickley & Dark, supra note 142, at 409 CLong-term contracts can help to inter-
nalize the benefits of franchisee investment in firm-specific human and physical capital With
frequent contract negotiation the likelihood of appropriation by the franchiser of the quasi-
rent from this type of investment increases.").
170. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regula-
tion: Issues and Evidence, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 157, 157, 160 (1995).
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cult to prove in a simple breach of contract action. 171 At-will termi-
nation protects the franchisor, but only by creating the potential for
franchisor opportunism. 172 The practical threat of opportunism may
be slight, however, given that franchisors are repeat players with
strong reputational constraints on their actions. 173 Any franchisor
that expects to continue franchising has little incentive to termi-
nate a contract without cause given that it negatively impacts the
price that other franchisees are willing to pay.174 Unless the fran-
chisor expects to go bankrupt, in which case even the regulations
will not bind the franchisor, the future value of its reputation
should contain it from behaving egregiously. The lack of a strong
market failure justification for these laws gives rise to the possibil-
ity that franchise termination laws are, at bottom, rent-seeking ef-
forts on the part of franchisees. 175
Even if a franchise termination law results from genuine con-
cerns for franchisees' weaker bargaining position, 176 the analysis
remains relevant so long as the reader agrees that one important
effect of the law is that it confers a benefit on franchisees at the
expense of franchisors. A law may be "good" or "bad," but if it is, in
essence, a one-time transfer of wealth, then a permissive stance on
choice-of-law provisions increases the likelihood of its enactment.
171. See id. at 159-60; Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP.
FIN. 9, 18 (1995).
172. See Beales & Muris, supra note 169, at 161; Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Deter-
minants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356, 359-60 (May
1980).
173. See Beales & Muris, supra note 169, at 161.
[T]he effect of the relative reputational loss on franchisors and franchisees who
engage in hold-ups is one reason why a contract results that appears (to some)
one-sided. Franchisors generally are more likely to have reputation capital
than are franchisees. Because franchisors are larger and transact more fre-
quently than franchisees, franchisor cheating is more likely to become known
than the cheating of a particular franchisee.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and
Production of the Institutional Framework. Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the
States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1999).
174. Smith, supra note 143, at 129-30.
175. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 96, at 339 ("The potential for inefficient spill-
overs seems significant... franchisees within a given state may be more influential than the
national franchisor organization .... Thus, state laws may benefit local franchisees at the
expense of national franchisors or consumers.").
176. In fact, I remain personally convinced that most laws contain a combination of private
and public interest motivators. For a similar position, see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
& GOVERNANCE 37-38 (1997). An articulated, credible public interest reduces taxpayer/voter
opposition, while a significant private interest ensures that some interest group will incur the
organizing and lobbying costs necessary to secure passage.
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C. Choice of Law with Single-Period Transfers
The public choice insights from Part II can be applied to the
assumption that the laws transfer wealth from franchisor to fran-
chisee. The greater the transfer, the more likely the franchisors will
organize in opposition to proposed franchise regulations, and the
more they are willing to spend to oppose their enactment. For pres-
ent purposes, I am interested in the converse proposition: the lower
the costs they expect to incur (all else equal), the less franchisors
are willing to invest in opposing franchisees' regulatory efforts.
And, the smaller the costs imposed on consumers, the more likely
that legislators think they can support the legislation without los-
ing voters' support.
Contractual choice of law becomes one way to lower the costs
associated with franchise contract regulation because it enables the
parties to opt out of the regulation in future periods. The intuition
that exit can be a substitute for "voice," or participation, in the po-
litical or bureaucratic process is widely acknowledged, 7 7 and the
reasoning here can be viewed as an application of that general prin-
ciple. In other contexts, education vouchers for example, public
policy makers become concerned that simplifying exit will generate
less voice, which may have the effect of lower quality decision
making. 78 Here, voice takes the form of opposition to proposed law.
Enabling cheap exit can make this category of laws more likely.
Does the ability to opt out of state franchise laws eviscerate
the value of the transfer itself by making it possible for the franchi-
sors to evade the burden of the regulation? Not necessarily. Some
wealth-transferring legislation confers benefits during each period
that the legislation remains in force, at least so long as the benefi-
ciary remains eligible for the benefits. Federal patent laws and the
Food Stamp Act provide examples. Qualifying individuals earn mo-
nopoly profits or receive food stamps, respectively, and the benefici-
aries are made better off during each additional period that they
remain entitled to these benefits. Other transfers, however, provide
only single-period gains no matter how long the conferring law re-
mains in force. The reasoning is straightforward. Especially in the
177. Probably the best known work expanding upon this intuition is ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970).
178. See id. at 45-46. Public school deterioration can cause parents to choose private
schools, which may, in turn, cause a "loss to the public schools of those member customers who
would be most motivated and determined to put up a fight against the deterioration if they did
not have the alternative of the private schools." Id.
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contractual context, the parties are often able to bargain around or
otherwise exit from the effects of the law. 17 9
Here, even if the franchisors are subject to the regulations
without the possibility of using contractual choice of law to opt out
of them, the franchisors can typically recoup much of the future fi-
nancial benefit conferred on the franchisees by raising the franchise
fee or royalty rates. Moreover, a franchisor often can increase the
rent on property it leases to franchisees, or it can raise the price it
charges for equipment, uniforms, accounting or inventory services,
and product supplies. 80 Even if designated third parties provide
these supplies, the franchisors can recoup their losses by charging
the third party more for the right to provide these goods and serv-
ices to franchisees. In turn, the third parties could pass these costs
on to the franchisees in the form of increased prices. In any event,
the franchisors have ample means available to ensure that, in fu-
ture contracts, the law does not have the effect of transferring sur-
plus wealth to franchisees.' 8'
The critical point is that the wealth-transferring aspect of
many laws represents, at best, a "one-time" hit. Unless the regula-
tion at issue is sufficiently pervasive or transactions costs otherwise
sufficiently high to prevent Coasean bargaining, it becomes possible
for the losing party to bargain around much if not all future-period
transfers. For regulators concerned with this future "evasion," per-
vasive regulation might end up eliminating that form of contracting
altogether. Here, for example, a state franchise commission could
be set up to monitor individual relationships to ensure that franchi-
sors are not bargaining around the financial advantage conferred
on the franchisees. To do that, however, the commission must rou-
tinely conduct market studies in an effort to separate general infla-
179. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 617-18 (discussing the ability of sellers with market
power to raise prices in response to compulsory contract terms, thereby eliminating any redis-
tribution from sellers to consumers); David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and
Corporate Law Reform: Employment-at-Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 996
(1998) (noting that job security laws may result in lower wages).
180. Cf. Hadfield, supra note 146, at 935-36 (noting variety of ways in which a franchisor
can collect revenues from its franchisees).
181. The laws may also have the effect of transferring wealth between franchisees. See
Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 275 (1993). Those franchi-
sees who deal primarily with non-repeat customers can more easily shirk with the legal pro-
tections than they could without them. See id. If the franchisor responds by raising the price of
every franchise contract, then the repeat-customer franchisees end up paying for some of the
shirking of the other franchisees. This transfer could persist over time, but because it re-
quires a segregation of the small, local franchisee interest group, it is unlikely to be the pri-
mary motivation behind any of the termination laws.
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tionary forces from franchisor usurpation. And, no doubt, it would
end up mediating a large number of franchise disputes.
Our society makes significant efforts to prevent evasion in
some areas, including labor disputes and employment discrimina-
tion. However, the more draconian the bureaucratic web built
around a given industry or business form, the greater the risk that
the industry or business form will be driven out of the market. In
the franchising context this result is unacceptable,18 2 even to the
franchisees seeking protection. 183 And, even if franchising remains
profitable with pervasive regulation, taxpayers are much less likely
to assent to paying large sums for fair franchising than they might
for fair employment. The latter is a larger social problem that will
likely directly touch the lives of many more voters. Because fran-
chisors' ex post price increases cannot realistically be prevented,
franchisees can expect only a single-period financial benefit.184
Even this "single-period" transfer can be worth seeking, how-
ever, if it involves a large enough transfer or a long enough "pe-
riod." Because franchise contracts are typically long-term, 185 the
single-period transfer can entail an advantage for as long as twenty
years.186 Of course, in order for this transfer to be successful, the
regulation must apply to existing contracts. And, the contracts
182. Sometimes complex regulations are put in place precisely to eliminate some product
or service from the market. I once lived in a community with a "tenanes rights board," which
had the authority to review virtually any landlord decision that a tenant disliked. It appeared
as though the board was wasting both community time and tax dollars, given that the town
had virtually no renters. But a tenants righes board could be one means by which the com-
munity members maintained their property values. Straightforward exclusion of rental prop-
erties would be illegal, whereas efforts to "protect" the poor tenants would be applauded.
183. When franchisors threatened that the onerous Iowa law enacted in 1992 would drive
them out of the state, for example, the legislature amended the law to temper its harsh effects.
See Dennis E. Wieczorek, The Iowa Franchise Law: 1995 Amendments and Some Proposals for
1996, 15 FRANCHISE L.J. 43 (1995) (explaining the overhaul of the problematic 1992 law).
184. If franchisors can forecast the franchise regulations prior to their enactment, the
franchisees may not benefit financially, because the franchisors may be able to recoup the
transfer ex ante, in the initial contract. Alternatively, a franchisor that knew which states
would refrain from- regulating could evade the law ex ante with a choice-of-law clause, assum-
ing that it would be enforced. In short, even this one-time financial advantage may occur only
for those contracts that were not drafted with the subsequent legislation in mind. The theory
that individuals will respond ex ante to predicted government acts is sometime referred to as
"rational expectations." Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank In-
dependence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 439 (1998). If purchasers of government debt know that
the government can benefit by inflating its currency, the rational expectations model predicts
that they will demand a higher interest rate ex ante, thereby defeating the governments bene-
fit from inflation. See id.
185. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
186. Note that the long-term contracts, intended to reduce post-contractual opportunism
by franchisors, end up creating a potential tool for post-contractual opportunism by franchi-
sees.
1596
2000] OPTING OUT OF REGULATION 1597
clause can be a tool for franchisors to oppose18 7 or courts to
thwart 188 the transfer. But more than half of these states' regula-
tions seem to have been applied to existing contracts, 189 and the
mere possibility of its success can make lobbying efforts worth-
while. 190
Although the transfer itself may be a one-time hit, the regu-
lation can create dead weight losses that linger throughout the life
of the transfer. Franchise experts have concluded that the de-
creased ability to terminate franchises or refuse renewal decreases
franchisors' ability to effectively monitor franchisee product and
service quality.19 1 McDonald's and Dunkin Donuts both want to en-
sure that their retailers are providing clean establishments with
friendly service and uniform products. General Motors wants its
franchisees to provide effective service and repairs and to respect
warranties. Franchisees who depend primarily on local clientele
have strong incentives to provide high quality service and products.
But, those who service transients or outsiders, or who otherwise
engage in non-repeat trade, may have an incentive to free ride off
the name brand capital developed by the franchisor and the other
franchisees. Thus, the decreased ability to monitor the franchisees
leads to inefficient consequences, including reduced numbers of
187. See Brickley et al., supra note 144, at 115 & n.25 (noting that franchisors managed to
exclude existing contracts in the laws of six states, although the Wisconsin legislature later
amended its language to leave the issue ambiguous).
188. Retroactive application of the Iowa statute was held to violate the state and federal
contract clauses. See McDonald's Corp. v. Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597, 609 (S.D. Iowa 1993),
affl'd, Holiday Inns Franchising Inc. v. Branstad, 29 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Rolec,
Inc. v. Finlay Hydrascreen USA, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 67, 69-70 (D. Me. 1996) (holding the retro-
active application of Maine's Franchise Laws for Power Equipment, Machinery and Appliances
unconstitutional).
189. See supra note 186. One state, Delaware, actually included an explicit provision that
existing contracts were included in the regulation. See Brickley et al., supra note 144, at 115.
Another court actually applied Wisconsin's regulations to a pre-existing relationship despite a
statutory statement that they only applied to contracts entered into after the statute was
passed. See Reinders Brothers, Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 53 (7th Cir. 1980)
(involving a franchisor who sent superceding agreements, but no agreement had been signed
by the parties after the effective date of the statute).
190. Cf. Brickley et al, supra note 144, at 115-16 ("[G]iven that the issue has been taken
to court several times, there must have been at least some expectation that existing contracts
were covered.").
191. See Beale & Muris, supra note 169, at 159-60 (discussing franchisee incentives to
cheat and the importance of at-will termination to franchisor ability to discourage poor fran-
chise performance); Klein, supra note 170, at 30 (concluding that statutes hinder self-
enforcement of the contract relationship); cf. Millon, supra note 178, at 1003 C[S]hirking and
other misconduct will be harder to punish, and, therefore, more likely to occur under a job-
security contract term than under an at-will term.").
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franchises, 192 or reduced output and value, and, sometimes, in-
creased prices. 193 In addition, franchisors may shorten the franchise
contract term if they fear enhanced future regulatory interference
with existing contracts, and they may increase their lobbying ef-
forts to prevent the future statutes. 194 At a minimum, the laws
make it more costly for the franchisor to control for quality, making
the franchise form less profitable. 9 5
The choice-of-law clause helps to eliminate these dead weight
losses. To the extent that it does so effectively, both the franchisor
and franchisee can be made better off in future periods. Since they
can split the gains associated with increasing the value of their re-
lationship, once the wealth transfer becomes a fait accompli, nei-
ther side wishes to prohibit enforcement of the clauses. Indeed, con-
tractual choice of law may make some wealth transfers possible.
Typically, an interest group would not press for a law that creates
single-period benefits to its members if those beneficiaries will suf-
fer losses in perpetuity. Potential future contract gains are likely
the most promising means by which the parties are prevented from
behaving opportunistically, in the legislature as well as in the mar-
ketplace. 196 The contractual choice of law option can, however, skew
the costs and benefits of seeking legislative transfers to the point
where the efforts become worthwhile to the proponents.
192. See Brickley et al., supra note 144, at 130 ("Our cross-sectional tests of the distribu-
tion of owned versus franchised outlets across states suggests that the laws reduce the amount
of franchising relative to company ownership in industries where individual units are prone to
serving transient customers. In contrast, most of the evidence suggests that the laws do not
greatly affect other industries. These findings are consistent with the model that predicts that
the laws increase the costs of franchising relative to company ownership by making quality
control among franchises more expensive.").
193. See Smith, supra note 143, at 154 (providing an empirical study that indicates that
automobile franchise regulations have significantly increased dealer prices and reduced new
vehicle sales volume).
194. Cf. Brickley et al., supra note 144, at 116 ('Cecently, termination laws have been con-
sidered by other states. For example, during 1986, lawmakers in Missouri, New York, Massa-
chusetts, Alaska, and Tennessee introduced bills that would restrict franchise terminations to
cases of good cause. The IFA lobbied intensely against these bills and none were enacted.").
195. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Appraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
314-15 (1975) (noting that contractual interference hurts both franchisors and franchisees,
who profit from the goodwill of the entire enterprise); Rubin, supra note 145, at 232 (discuss-
ing economic effects of interference with franchise contracts).
196. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 11-19 (1984) (arguing that
cooperation can be sustained in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game); DAVID M. KREPS, GAME
THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 65-89 (1990) (same); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social
Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 n.129 (1999) (describing cooperation in
an iterated prisoner's dilemma context); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-
Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2024 (1987) (discussing cooperation in long-term con-
tracts).
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Moreover, the dead weight losses associated with diminished
monitoring ability also fall on consumers, who may end up paying
more for lower quality goods and services. The possibility that fran-
chisors may opt out in future periods therefore can also reduce tax-
payer opposition to the transfer. In sum, although it appears that
contractual choice of law has the effect of reducing the value of a
regulation to its proponents, it does not always do so, and, the opt
out can actually make it more likely that the law is enacted in the
first place.
Not surprisingly, then, of the eighteen states that have en-
acted franchise protection laws, only two, Iowa 97 and Washington,
prevent enforcement of both choice-of-forum and choice-of-law pro-
visions. 198 Both, of course, are needed to prevent franchise contracts
from opting out of the regulation, since a prohibition on choice of
law could be evaded by choosing to litigate exclusively in the non-
regulating state's courts. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent has
expanded the ability of foreign states to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over franchisees, even in the absence of a choice-of-forum pro-
vision, as long as the contract includes a provision choosing the law
of a state with substantial connection to the franchisor. 99
The analysis does not require that the reader believe that a
particular regulation is "bad," but only that attempts to transfer
future wealth through regulation are futile. If the state is unwilling
or unable to monitor behavior along all possible margins, the regu-
lation creates no more than a one-time benefit, and contractual
choice of law becomes the best way to effectuate and preserve that
one-time transfer while mitigating the dead weight costs associated
with it. Suppose, for example, that one believes that franchise pro-
197. Interestingly, because retroactive application of the Iowa statute was held unconstitu-
tional, supra note 187, any transfers to franchisees must come from subsequent contracts.
The prohibition on both choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses, coupled with at least some
franchisors' inability to recoup the transfer in future contracts, represent the only means by
which wealth can be transferred as a result of the legislation. Because Iowa's law also ap-
pears to be much more restrictive than others, see Wieczorek, supra note 183, at 43 (noting
that the 1992 law "was the most comprehensive" in the United States, although 1995 amend-
ments watered down draconian effects), the legislature appears to have attempted to achieve
the transfer by preventing all evasive efforts in future contracts. Consistent with the analysis
in this Part, the franchisors claimed that the law "made it impossible for franchisors to oper-
ate in Iowa and consequently endangered Iowa residents' investments in franchised busi-
nesses." Id. Also consistent with the analysis, when franchisors' threats were perceived as
credible, the law was watered down. Id.
198. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 96, at 343.
199. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 484-85 (1984) (holding that Flor-
ida courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over Michigan franchisee). The Court relied
primarily on the facts that the franchisee entered into a long-term contract with the franchisor
headquartered in Florida, and that the franchise agreement chose Florida law. Id.
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tection laws attempt to correct disparities in bargaining power, and
that even a one-time amelioration is better than nothing. If so, then
that individual should embrace contractual opt outs because the opt
out enhances the likelihood that the franchise protection law will be
enacted.
Suppose instead that one is committed to the virtues of free-
dom to contract. Perhaps paradoxically, this individual may find
himself opposing choice-of-law clauses because permitting them
may enhance the likelihood that a given restrictive regulation is
enacted. Thus, there exists an inherent tension between freedom to
contract within individual transactions and freedom to contract in
the sense of an absence of regulation. Regarding one-time wealth
transfers, the Libertarian ultimately must choose among second-
best worlds. 200
There are, of course, other potential purposes served by fran-
chise termination laws that this analysis does not address, at least
not in any definitive sense. First, the laws could be intended to
achieve what they claim-protection against opportunistic termina-
tion-without regard to wealth transfers or efficiency analysis. The
drafters might simply wish to prevent these terminations and sec-
ond-guess the parties' failure to bargain for these protections them-
selves.201 Of course, if the proponents care about the substance
rather than the effects of regulations, then they might prefer to
prevent contractual opt outs. As indicated earlier, the conclusion
may turn on whether proponents believe that prohibiting opt outs
threatens the law's enactment.
Second, there is a possible efficiency justification for fran-
chise termination laws. Termination protections could be the effi-
cient means by which to balance post-contractual opportunism be-
tween the parties, especially if franchisees cannot bargain for the
protections individually because of signaling difficulties. Any fran-
chisee that requests protection from termination may signal that
she intends to free ride off the franchised trademark, making bar-
200. Of course, whether contractual choice of law ultimately leads to greater or lesser
regulation is an empirical question involving the relative elasticities of one-shot and continu-
ing transfers. Cf. John R. Lott, Jr., Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: Or, Why the Differ-
ence Between the Chicago and Virginia Schools Is Really an Elasticity Question, 91 PUB.
CHOICE 219 (1997) (explaining that constitutional restrictions on wealth transfers increases
the costs of those transfers but also eliminates some transfers, so that the net effect on social
welfare is uncertain).
201. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 624-49 (arguing that paternalism can justify inter-
ference with contract). On the subject of paternalistic contracting restrictions, see generally
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (dis-
cussing three forms of paternalism).
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gaining over this issue impracticable. 2 2 This potential market fail-
ure may be corrected with franchise termination laws. Of course,
the efficiency argument does not resolve the issue of contractual opt
outs, because, by switching the bargaining burden, a default rule
could turn out to be the most efficient approach to this problem.20 3
In any event, this article is confined to the wealth-transferring
rather than allocative aspects of the regulations.
Finally, some franchise protection laws provide territorial se-
curity to franchisees and prevent cross-selling and bootlegging of
the franchised product. 20 4 These laws create barriers to entry while
enabling franchisees to provide higher quality customer service. To
the extent that these laws simply transfer wealth from franchisor to
franchisee, the above analysis applies. If instead these laws provide
periodic benefits to both franchisors and franchisees by enabling
the maintenance of trademark quality, the analysis in this Article
is inapplicable.
D. Contractual Choice and Statutory Repeal Compared
The analysis of single-period transfers raises a final, inter-
esting question: if Coasean bargaining confines the transfer to pe-
riod 1 but the regulation creates future losses for both producers
and consumers, why doesn't the legislature simply repeal the stat-
ute? If the benefits of a law have been exhausted but its costs re-
main, then would not the repeal represent a Pareto improvement,
the type of action that Becker predicts from entrepreneurial legisla-
tors? As an alternative to contractual choice of law, statutory repeal
also saves parties the costs (and potential uncertainty) of attempt-
ing to opt out of the law. Nevertheless, the proponents of regulatory
transfers likely prefer choice of law to statutory repeal. Recall that
the single-period transfers work best in the context of long-term
contracts. Once a new long-term contract is drafted, those burdened
by the law refashion the contract terms to undo future-period trans-
fers. Under the new contract, then, a repeal of the statute would
202. Cf. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1957-62 (1996)
(discussing the comparable argument supporting employment termination protections); Mil-
Ion, supra note 178, at 1021 n.162 (same).
203. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing the theories of default
behind the gaps found in contracts and the ways in which lawmakers should fill those gaps).
204. See Smith, supra note 143, at 133-35.
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end up creating a transfer away from those initially benefited by
the law.
A repeal of franchise regulations, for example, would gener-
ate a windfall in favor of the franchisor in all contracts that had
been negotiated after the law took effect. Under these new con-
tracts, franchisees pay more for their franchises than they other-
wise would because they are paying for the protections from termi-
nation provided by the statute. Franchisees continue to pay for
those protections in a variety of possible forms for the duration of
the contract period, even if the protections disappear during the
contract term. Without those protections, then, the franchisors re-
ceive a windfall for the remainder of the contract term. Conse-
quently, the franchisees would oppose interim efforts to eliminate
the very regulations for which they are paying. Because they had
the political clout to generate the regulations, franchisees would,
most likely, also have the ability to prevent their repeal. From the
vantage point of the regulatory proponents, then, choice-of-law
clauses are superior to regulatory repeal.20 5 The initial transfer is
preserved when the regulatory reversal is prevented, and, simulta-
neously, the future inefficiencies are avoided. 20 6
In addition, some franchisors may be unable to completely re-
coup future transfers created by the regulation. Market conditions
and/or transaction costs may prevent them from passing all of their
costs on to the franchisees. Moreover, even with contractual choice
of law, the costs of opting out of the law may preclude some franchi-
sors from using it. Recall that under the Second Restatement, for
example, parties typically can choose alternative law to avoid man-
datory rules only if the state whose law is chosen bears a substan-
tial relationship to the parties or the contract. 20 7 Franchisors might
therefore be forced to change corporate headquarters in order to
take advantage of opting out of the law. If some franchisors cannot
prevent future transfers with Coasean bargaining or contractual
205. The textual explanation is an alternative to that offered previously in the public
choice literature. See Robert E. McCormick et al., The Disinterest in Deregulation, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 1075 (1984) (discussing the little interest group support for deregulation due to
the fact that rent-seeking expenditures, which can make up the bulk of the cost of laws, are
already sunk). Unlike the McCormick explanation, my hypothesis does not require proof that
rent-seeking expenditures are high relative to the transfers. See Dougan & Snyder, Rents,
supra note 121, at 810 (noting that successful interest groups contain costs of rent-seeking).
206. The textual explanation might help explain why some seemingly inefficient or obso-
lete laws remain on the books. Politically, contracting around becomes more palatable, de-
spite the transactions costs associated with doing so.
207. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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choice of law, then their franchisees also can be expected to oppose
the statute's repeal.
Interestingly, the contractual opt out might be the most effec-
tive means by which to ensure passage of a regulatory proposal.
Because opt outs entail costs, they are more likely to be used by
those who suffer most from the regulation. The more the loser will
suffer from proposed regulation, the harder the fight to defeat its
enactment. Contractual choice of law can therefore be a way to si-
lence vocal opponents while transferring wealth from politically
inactive losers. Contractual choice of law may therefore enable a
kind of price discrimination between those regulated entities who
suffer more and those who suffer less under the law.
CONCLUSION
According to public choice theory, regulation can be the most
effective means by which interest groups obtain "non-equalizing"
wealth transfers in the legislature. However, in the context of the
regulation of contracts, future wealth transfers between the con-
tracting parties can be eliminated if the loser can alter the terms of
future contracts with the winner. In these circumstances, the
regulation can transfer wealth only in a single period, and what
remains of the legislation is a dead weight loss borne by the parties
and by consumers.
Contractual choice of law can mitigate the dead weight losses
associated with these laws, making it more likely that they will be
enacted in the first place. Moreover, from the perspective of the
law's proponents and supporting legislators (who attempt to aid
their proponent constituents), contractual choice of law is prefer-
able to the subsequent repeal of the law. And, by retaining these
laws on the books, the legislature may enhance the public's percep-
tion that the government is actively promoting fair treatment for
all.
The academic debate over contractual choice of law is some-
what misdirected because its function and effects can be misunder-
stood. Contrary to the assertions of its opponents, contractual
choice of law does not always represent evasion of the law itself.
Evasion of the wealth transfer can occur on its own through poten-
tial exit or alteration of the contract terms. In these cases, contrac-
tual choice of law instead mitigates the dead weight costs associ-
ated with the regulation. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of its
proponents, contractual choice of law will not necessarily produce a
decrease in rent-seeking legislation, at least in the short run. In-
stead, the availability of contractual choice of law can make it pos-
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sible for inefficient interest group bargains to arise in the first
place.
